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Rapid industrialisation in countries around the world has resulted in an increase in various 
types of pollution. Noise pollution is one example of such pollution. Like other types of 
pollution, for example water and air pollution, uncontrolled noise pollution can have 
detrimental consequences for human beings and animals. There is therefore an urgent need to 
control noise pollution in order to prevent or reduce these negative consequences.  
This dissertation focuses on the control of noise pollution in South Africa. In chapter one a 
general background will be provided in order to define and explain what noise is and describe 
the detrimental effects of uncontrolled noise on human beings. The remainder of the 
dissertation will critically evaluate the common law and statutory rules that are applicable to 
the control of noise pollution in South Africa. In addition to discussing the applicable 
common law and legislation I will also discuss noise pollution from the perspective of  
human rights by providing a discussion of the environmental right contained in the Bill of 
Rights. A few decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, where noise was considered 
to be a factor that breached a fundamental right enshrined in the European Convention on 
Human Rights, will also be analysed. Finally, some general conclusions will be made in the 
chapter five, together with recommendations on possible ways to enhance the current legal 
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“Unnecessary noise is the most cruel absence of care which can be inflicted on either sick 






In early civilisations sound was viewed as an asset rather than a nuisance. This is because it 
served many purposes, foremost as a means of communication. Over the past century, 
however, this perception has changed and today sound in the form of noise1 is recognised as a 
form of pollution2 in many countries around the world, including South Africa. 
 
Section 1 of the National Environmental Management Act (‘the NEMA’),3 thus, defines 
pollution as ‘any change in the environment caused by –  
(a)  substances; 
(b)  radioactive or other wastes; or 
(c)  noise, odours, dust or heat, emitted from any activity, including the storage or 
treatment of waste or substances, construction and the provision of services, whether 
engaged in by any person or an organ of state, where that change has an adverse effect 
on human health or wellbeing or on the composition, resilience and productivity of 
natural or managed ecosystems, or on materials useful to people, or will have such an 






                                                 
1 The term ‘noise’ is derived from the Latin word ‘nausea’ implying ‘unwanted sound’ or sound that is 
‘unpleasant or unexpected’. 
2 ‘Pollution’ may be defined as ‘the introduction by man into the environment of substances or energy liable to  
cause hazards to human health, harm to living resources and ecological systems, damage to structures or 
amenity, or interferences with legitimate uses of the environment’ (see MW Holdgate A Perspective on 
Environmental Pollution (1979) p 7). 
3 107 of 1998. 
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Although there are a number of reasons why sound in the form of noise is recognised as a 
pollutant today, among the most important are: 
 
(a)  first, that as a result of the industrial revolution and the development of means of 
transport and communication, human beings are exposed to noise from a much wider 
range of sources today than ever before;4 and  
 
(b)  second, that noise affects both the physiological and psychological health of human 
beings. As Singh and Davar have pointed out, ‘noise is a low and subtle killer, and is 
a hazard to the quality of life’.5 
 




In the modern world noise originates from a variety of sources. Among these are industrial 
noise, transportation noise, construction and building noise and domestic noise. Each of these 
sources is discussed briefly below. 
 
(b) Industrial noise 
 
Different types of machines used in the industrial process create substantial noise problems.6 
The noise created by the machines and other equipment will affect both workers in the 
industry as well as people who live in the areas surrounding of the factory or construction 




                                                 
4 G Firdaus and A Ahmed ‘Noise Pollution and Human Health: A Case Study of the Municipal Corporation of  
   Delhi’ (2010) 19 Indoor and Built Environment 648. 
5 N Singh and SC Davar ‘Noise Pollution – Sources, Effects and Control’ (2004) 16(3) Journal of Health  
  Ecology 181. 
6 B Berglund, T Lindvall and H Schwela(eds) Guidelines for Community Noise (1999), available at  
   http://www.who.int/docstore/peh/noise/guidelines2.html, Accessed on 5 January 2012 
7  Ibid p25. 
8  Ibid. 
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(c) Transportation noise 
 
The varied modes of transport used in modern society also create significant noise problems.9 
Transportation noise is one of the major causes of the increase in noise pollution in the world 
today, the main sources of which are rail, road and air.10 The noise generally increases with 
the size and weight of the vehicle.  
 
Insofar as road vehicles are concerned, most of the noise they emit is generated from the 
engines as well as the contact between the vehicle with the road surface and the air.11 In 
countries where trains are a popular means of transport, noise emissions will depend on the 
speed of the trains.12 
 
Aircraft noise has long been considered to be one of the major contributors to noise pollution 
in many countries throughout the world.13 A substantial noise is generated by aircraft in areas 
close to airports.14 On take- off a plane it produces intolerable noise. A bigger plane, because 
it is heavier, will cause more noise than a smaller and lighter aircraft.15 The main source of 
the noise is the engine of the aircraft, which in modern times has been mechanically adapted 
to produce less noise than older aircraft.16 
 
(d) Construction and building noise 
 
The construction industry is responsible for high noise emissions.17 The source of the noise is 
the machinery used for the purposes of construction, for example, cement mixers, cranes, 
drills, and hammers and so on.18 The reason is that the equipment used in the industry is often 
inadequately silenced and maintained, and that the consequences of environmental noise are 
often neglected in building operations.19  
 
                                                 
9  Ibid 
10 Ibid 
11 Ibid  







19 Ibid.  
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(e) Domestic noise  
 
Noise in residential areas comes from a variety of sources and is arguably the most difficult 
to control.20 Music, barking dogs, loud voices, lawn mowers, vacuum cleaners as well as 
other household equipment are the most frequent generators of noise.21 Moreover, religious 
activities, such as the ringing of church bells, the call to prayer by the muezzin from a 
mosque and other religious festivals have also lead to noise complaints.22 
 




Given that noise originates from so many sources in the modern world, it is not surprising 
that it may have an adverse effect on the physical, physiological and psychological health of 
human beings. 
 
(b) Physical effects 
 
The effect of severe noise for a continuous period of time can lead to severe trauma in human 
beings. Very loud sounds, for example noise from blasting operations will cause substantial 
trauma in human beings, and will in addition also cause physical damage to structures and 









                                                 
20 Ibid 
21 Ibid 
22 Ibid.  




(c) Physiological effects 
 
The effects of noise are not limited to the physical, as noise can also have significant 
physiological effects. The most important physiological effect of noise is loss of hearing 
acuity.24  Recurrent exposure to high levels of noise, from nightclubs or construction 
machinery could ultimately lead to hearing loss.25  
 
(d) Psychological effects 
 
The psychological effects of noise represent the most significant effect from an 
environmental point of view. Noise causes annoyance which ultimately leads to negative 
community reaction. This will inevitably lead to a diminished quality of life based on the lack 
of tranquillity and the inability to enjoy leisure time as well as your property.26 
 
(e) Other effects 
 
In addition to the physical, physiological and psychological effects set out above, noise also 
has other adverse effects on humans. Among these are sleep deprivation and a loss of 
productivity. Sleep deprivation is one of the most widespread sources of distress caused by 








                                                 
24 Ibid 
25 See (note 6) p 48-49. There is also a growing body of evidence that points to the fact that noise pollution has a 
temporary and permanent effect on humans and other mammals by way of the endocrine and autonomic nervous 
systems. This is based on the fact that noise acts as a biological stressor and elicits a reaction that prepares the 
body for a fight or flight response. Given this fact, it has been argued that noise can trigger endocrine and 
autonomic nervous system responses that affect the cardiovascular system which can then put an individual at 
risk for cardiovascular disease. The effects become apparent with long term exposure to noise (see L Goines and 
L Hagler ‘Noise Pollution: A Modern Plague’ (2007) 100 Southern Medical Journal 290). 
26 See (note 6) p49 an d SA Stansfeld and MP Matheson ‘Noise Pollution: non-auditory effects on health’ 
(2003) British Medical Bulletin 247 -248. 
27 See (note 6) p45. 
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Although noise is recognised as a form of pollution in South Africa, it is submitted that it is 
very difficult to control. This is due to the transient nature of noise which prevents it from 
collecting in the environment like other types of pollution. As Kerse points out ‘noise leaves 
no visible scars; nor fish floating dead in the stream, no besmirched buildings and 
sculptures’.28 Despite this, it is nevertheless possible to control noise pollution at three 
different points, namely: at its source; during its transmission path; or at its receiver.29 
 
(b) At the source  
 
Noise spreads very easily. The most cost effective method of preventing noise pollution 
therefore, is to control it at its source.30 Noise may be controlled at its source by including 
noise standards in the design and planning stages.31 The public must be made aware of noise 
and its impact of the wider society. It is suggested that noise awareness programmes must be 
implemented, so as to educate the public about noise in the same manner as is done in respect 
of other forms of pollution.32 
 
(c) In the transmission path 
 
If noise cannot be abated at the source, the next approach is to control noise while it is en 
route to the hearer. ‘This can be done by enclosing the source, by the erection of suitable 
barriers, and by ensuring that buildings provide reasonable attenuation to  noise generated 
internally and externally.’33 
 
                                                 
28 CS Kerse The Law Relating to Noise (1975) at 1. 




33 Ibid p 577 
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Noise can also be controlled en route to the hearer, by some form of barrier. These barriers 
can be in form of physical barriers such as roadside embankments or sound insulation; or 
they can take the form of spatial barriers, through town planning and zoning.34 
 
(d) At the receiver 
 
Controlling noise at this point is the least economical option. At this stage, the victim of the 
noise has to be isolated or relocated because of the lack of  attention to the possible effects of 
noise during the planning process.35 If noise from traffic or industry is intolerable for the 
recipient, the soundproofing of houses and offices is the only solution.36 If these attempts do 
not succeed, it then becomes necessary to move the victims of the noise.37 
 
 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Although noise is recognised as a pollutant in NEMA, the effects of noise pollution; the 
manner in which it is regulated in South Africa; and the human rights consequences of noise 
pollution have not been given as much attention as they deserve. 
 
The aims and objects of this dissertation, therefore, are to critically examine the legal 
principles and rules governing the regulation of noise pollution in South Africa.perspective. 
 
More particularly, the aims and objects of this dissertation are to: 
(a)  set out and critically discuss the statutory provisions regulating noise pollution in 
South Africa; 
(b)  set out and critically discuss the common law provisions regulating noise pollution in 
South Africa; 
(c)  set out and discuss noise pollution from a human rights perspective in South Africa; 
and 
(d)  provide recommendations on how noise pollution control may be improved in South 
Africa. 
                                                 
34  Ibid p577. 
35  Ibid p578. 
36  Ibid. 
37  Ibid. 
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1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This is a desk-top study. It is based largely on primary and secondary legal materials. These 
materials include statutes, law reports and the old authorities. In addition, they also include 
textbooks, journal articles, reports and internet websites. 
 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 




The aims and objects of the dissertation are set out in chapter one. Apart from the aims and 
objects, the backgrounds, the research methodology, the structure of the dissertation and the 




The statutory principles and rules that govern noise pollution in South Africa are set out and 




The common law principles and rules that govern noise pollution in South Africa are set out 




This chapter provides a discussion on  human rights and noise pollution both in South Africa 
and in Europe. Some recently cases decided by the European Human Rights court relating to 








This chapter provides conclusions on the efficacy of the current legal framework in dealing 
with noise pollution control in the. Recommendations are made on changes that may enhance 
the current legal framework. 
 
1.5 KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
 
Before turning to discuss the statutory principles that regulate noise pollution in South Africa, 




Noise is defined as ‘a sound without agreeable musical quality or unwanted or undesired 




Sound is essentially what we hear. If the fluctuations in the static air pressure around us occur 
approximately between 20 and 16 000 times per second, our ears hear these rapid fluctuations 
as audible sound.40  The pitch of the sound is dependent on how rapidly the fluctuations 
occur, whilst the frequency of the sound is determined by the ‘rate at which the fluctuations 
occur, in cycles per second’.41 Frequency of sound is measured in hertz.  
 
The loudness of the sound will depend on the ‘amount by which the air pressure deviates 
from its static value’.42 The pressure deviations are referred to as the amplitude. If the 
deviation is greater, the amplitude increases and the human ear then perceives this as a louder 
sound. Sound pressure is measured in terms of a logarithmic scale.  
 
                                                 
38 A Bell ‘Noise – An occupational Hazard and Public Nuisance’ (1966), available at   
    http://www.who.int/iris/handle/10665/39744, accessed on 15 January 2012. 
39 See Kerse (note 28) at 1. 





The unit to measure sound is the decibel. A sound which has a sound pressure of 0dB would 
be hardly audible, whereas a sound pressure of around 140dB would be that of a jet aircraft 
taking off. In the average home setting during the day, 50dB would be regarded as normal, 
whilst a normal loudness in the same home at night would be 40dB.43 
 
1.5.3 Measuring noise 
 
Understanding how to regulate noise, requires an understanding of how noise is measured. 
Sound is described by wave theory. It is the amplitude or height of the sound wave that 
determines the loudness or volume of the sound.44 The pitch or tone of the sound is 
determined by the compression or frequency of the waves.45 The effect of noise is also 
determined by the pressure.46 Sound is described as the physical variation of atmospheric 
pressure.47 It is measured in terms of the logarithmic scale due to the large variations that 
may occur. 48The measurement is expressed in units of the decibel. The frequency of the 
sound is the rate at which fluctuations occur, in cycles per second. 49 
 
The common measure of noise is the decibel (dB), which is a logarithmic measure. 
Instruments that measure noise in South Africa are equipped with circuitry to mimic the ear’s 
sensitivity to sound.50 The human ear is not equally sensitive to all frequencies, and as a 
result the sensitivity of the noise measuring instrument was adapted so that it reacted in the 
same manner as the human ear.51  The consequent adaptation is referred to as frequency 
weighting.52 It is known as the A-weighting and is used for this purpose.53 In order to indicate 
sound measurements that employ the A-weighting, dBA or dB(A) are used. Using the A scale 
means that when the loudness is doubled, it is roughly equal to an increase in the sound level 
of 10dBA.54  
 
                                                 
43 Ibid p 573 
44 J Glazewski Environmental Law in South Africa (2000) p739. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid 
47 Ibid p740. 
48 Ibid 
49 Ibid 
50 A Semmelink  and MA Rabie ‘Noise’ in RF Fuggle and MA Rabie Environmental Concerns in South Africa 
1983 366 at 367. 
51 See Johnston (note 23) p572. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid p572. 
54 R Taylor Noise (1979) p 60. 
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Noise is subjective as different people will react differently to the same noise or sound.55   
This therefore poses problems when the impact of the noise requires assessment and 
furthermore, when one intends to set limitations. The criterion that has been adopted in 
practice is, in any given situation, to look at the ‘level beyond which a significant number of 
























                                                 




CHAPTER TWO: THE STATUTORY CONTROL OF NOISE 
POLLUTION 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out and discuss the statutory provisions that regulate 
noise pollution in South Africa. Before doing so, however, it will be helpful to briefly set out 
and discuss the manner in which the power to make laws is divided amongst the three spheres 
of government. This is because noise pollution is expressly listed as a functional area of 
exclusive provincial competence in Part B of Schedule 5 of the Constitution.57 
 
2.2 THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Legislative and executive authority in South Africa is divided amongst the national, 
provincial and local spheres of government.  
 
2.2.1 The legislative authority of Parliament 
 
At a national level, legislative authority is vested in Parliament. The legislative authority 
vested in Parliament is set out in section 44 of the Constitution which provides that 
Parliament has the authority to:  
(a)  amend the Constitution;58 
(b)  pass legislation with regard to any matter, including those matters over which it shares 
concurrent legislative authority (set out in Schedule 4) with the provinces, but 
excluding those matters over which the provinces have exclusive authority (set out in 
Schedule 5);59 and  
(c)  assign any of its legislative powers, except the power to amend the Constitution, to 
any other legislative body.60  
 
 
                                                 
57 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
58 Section 44(1)(a)(i). 
59 Section 44(1)(a)(ii). 
60 Section 44(1)(a)(iii). 
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2.2.2 The legislative authority of the provincial legislatures 
 
At a provincial level, legislative authority is vested in the Provincial Legislatures. The 
legislative authority vested in the Provincial Legislatures is set out in section 104(1) of the 
Constitution which provides that the Provincial Legislatures have the authority to:  
(a)  adopt a provincial Constitution;61 
(b)  assign any of their legislative powers to a municipal council in the province 
concerned;62 
(c)  pass legislation on any matter set out in Schedule 4;63 
(d)  pass legislation on any matter set out in Schedule 5;64 
(e)  pass legislation on any matter outside of Schedule 4 and 5 which has been assigned to 
the provinces by Parliament;65 and 
(f)  pass legislation on any matter which has been assigned to the provinces by the 
Constitution.66 
 
2.2.3 Legislative authority of the municipal councils 
 
At a local level, legislative authority is vested in the Municipal Councils. The legislative 
authority vested in Municipal Councils is set out in section 156(2) of the Constitution which 
provides that Municipal Councils may adopt and administer by-laws for the effective 
administration of matters which they have the power to administer. Municipal Councils have 
the power to administer the local government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part 
B of Schedule 5. This means that Municipal Councils may adopt by-laws in respect of the 







                                                 
61 Section 104 (1)(a). 
62 Section 104(1)(c). 
63 Section 104(1)(b)(i). 
64 Section 104(1)(b)(ii). 
65 Section 104(1)(b)(iii). 
66 Section 104 (b)(iv). 
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2.2.4 Federalism limits on the authority to pass legislation 
 
The division of legislative competencies between the different spheres of government set out 
above imposes important limits on each legislature. This is because a law passed by a 
legislature which did not have the necessary competence to pass that law will be invalid. One 
of the most important aspects of this division of legislative authority is that, as a general rule, 
only the provincial legislatures may enact laws in respect of the functional areas set out in 
Schedule 5 of the Constitution. Or to put it another way, Parliament does not, as a general 
rule, have the power to legislate in these areas.67 
 




The functional areas of exclusive provincial competence set out in Schedule 5 are divided 
into two categories: first, those set out in Part A of Schedule 568 and those set out in Part B of 
Schedule 5.69 While the authority to pass legislation on a subject matter set out in part A of 
Schedule 5 is vested in the Provincial Legislatures only, the authority to pass legislation on  
the subject-matters set out in Part B of Schedule 5 is vested in both the Provincial 
Legislatures and the Municipal Councils. 
 
The functional areas of exclusive provincial competence set out in Part B of Schedule 5 
include ‘noise pollution’. In principal this means that Parliament has no authority to pass a 
law that falls into this functional area. The authority to pass laws that fall into the functional 
                                                 
67 See DW Freedman ‘Constitutional Law: Structures of Government’ LAWSA Vol 5 Part 3 2ed (2012) at para 
223 
68 The functional areas of exclusive provincial competence set out in Part A of Schedule 5 are as follows: 
Abattoirs; ambulance services; archives other than national archives; libraries other than national libraries; 
liquor licences; museums other than national museums; provincial planning; provincial cultural matters; 
provincial recreation and amenities; provincial sport; provincial roads and traffic; veterinary services, excluding 
the regulation of the profession. 
69 The functional areas of exclusive provincial competence set out in Part B of Schedul5 are as follows: Beaches 
and amusements facilities; billboards and the display of advertisements in public places; cleansing; control of 
public nuisances; control of undertakings that sell liquor to the public; facilities for the accommodation, care and 
burial of animals; fencing and fences; licensing of dogs; licensing and control of undertakings that sell food to 
the public; local amenities; local sport facilities; markets; municipal abattoirs; municipal parks and recreation; 
municipal roads; noise pollution; pounds; public places; refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal; 
street trading; street lighting and traffic and parking. 
22 
 
area of ‘noise pollution’ vests exclusively in the Provincial Legislatures and Municipal 
Councils. 
 
(b) The power to intervene in Schedule 5 
 
The fact that Parliament does not have the authority to pass legislation that falls into the 
functional area of ‘noise pollution’, however, is subject to an exception. This exception is set 
out in section 44(2) of the Constitution which provides that Parliament may intervene and 
pass a law dealing with a Schedule 5 matter if it satisfies the criteria listed in section 44(2) of 
the Constitution. 
 
In terms of s 44(2) Parliament may only enact such legislation if it is necessary to: 
(a)  maintain national security; 
(b)  maintain economic unity; 
(c)  maintain essential national standards; 
(d)  establish minimum standards required for the rendering of services; or 
(e)  prevent unreasonable action taken by a province which is prejudicial to the interests 
of another province or to the country as a whole. 
 
Although the grounds upon which Parliament may intervene are broadly defined it is 
important to note that Parliament may only intervene of it is ‘necessary’ to achieve one of the 
objectives set out in paragraphs (a) to (e). As a result, Parliament’s powers of intervention are 
considerably limited. The term ‘necessary’ appears to mean that there must be no other 
alternative to achieve the objectives other than by national intervention.  
 
In Ex parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill,70 for example, the 
Constitutional Court explained that the mere fact that something is important does not mean it 
is necessary. And in Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification 
of the Constitution of the RSA 1996 71 the Court held that the power of intervention under 
section 44(2) is defined and limited. ‘If regard is had to the nature of the schedule 5 powers 
                                                 
70 2000 (1) SA 732 (CC) (hereafter the Liquor Bill case). 
71 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) (hereafter the First Certification Judgment) at para 257. See also Certification of the 
Amended Text of the Constitution of the RSA, 1996 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC) at para 106.  
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and the requirements of section 44(2), the occasion for intervention by Parliament is likely to 
be limited’.  
 
These statements indicate that the Constitutional Court will not easily allow Parliament to 
intervene in a Schedule 5 matter in terms of section 44(2). 
 
(c) The scope and ambit of the functional areas set out in Schedule 5 
 
The scope and ambit of the functional areas set out in Schedule 5 was discussed by the 
Constitutional Court in the Liquor Bill case.  
 
The facts of this case were as follows. After being passed by both Houses of Parliament, the 
Liquor Bill was sent to the President for his assent and signature. The President, however, 
had reservations about the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Bill and, acting 
in terms of section 79(4)(b)of the Constitution, he referred it back to the National Assembly 
for reconsideration. Unfortunately, the National Assembly failed to address the President’s 
concerns and, acting in terms of section 79(4)(b) of the Constitution, he then referred it to the 
Constitutional Court for a decision on its constitutional validity. 
 
The President’s concerns about the constitutional validity of the Bill were based on the 
following grounds: (a) that the Bill divided the liquor industry into three categories, namely, 
manufacturing, distributing and retail selling; (b) that it treated manufacturing and 
distributing as national issues and retail selling as a provincial issue; and (c) that it contained 
detailed provisions regulating the manner in which the national government should licence 
manufacturers and distributors and the manner in which the provincial governments should 
licence retail sellers. 
 
The problem with these provisions, the President stated in his referral, is that they appeared to 
fall into the functional area of ‘liquor licencing’ which is a functional area of exclusive 
provincial competence listed in Part A of Schedule 5 of the Constitution. 
 
The Constitutional Court found that while the provisions regulating the manner in which the 
national government should licence manufacturers and distributors did not fall into the 
functional area of ‘liquor licencing’, those regulating the manner in which the provincial 
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governments should licence retail sellers did and, consequently, that they fell outside of 
Parliament’s legislative competence. In addition, the Court also found that these provisions 
could not be classified as an authorised intervention because they did not satisfy the criteria  
set out in section 44(2). The provisions regulating the manner in which the provincial 
governments should licence retail sellers, therefore, were unconstitutional and invalid. 
 
In arriving at this decision the Constitutional Court interpreted the matters set out in Schedule 
5 very narrowly. Essentially, the Court held that while Schedule 4 encompasses those 
activities that take place inter-provincially (across provincial boundaries), Schedule 5 only 
encompasses those activities that take place primarily intra-provincially (within provincial 
boundaries). In other words, the matters set out in Schedule 5 encompass only those activities 
that take place within the boundaries of a province. As soon as an activity takes place across 
provincial boundaries it is no longer a Schedule 5 matter.  
 
Insofar as noise pollution is concerned this seems to mean that while Parliament can pass 
legislation regulating noise pollution that takes place across provincial boundaries (for 
example, transport (aircraft and trains) noise), it cannot regulate noise pollution that takes 
places within the boundaries of a province (for example, building, industrial and domestic 
noises), unless that legislation in question satisfies the criteria set out in section 44(2) of the 
Constitution.72 
 
Having set out the manner in which the power to pass legislation regulating noise pollution is 
divided amongst the three spheres of government, we may now set out and discuss the 









                                                 
72 I Currie and J de Waal The New Constitutional & Administrative Law (2001) 167-169. 
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2.3 THE ENVIRONMENT CONSERVATION ACT  
 
When it comes to the control of noise pollution, the Environment Conservation Act (‘the 
ECA’)73 contains the most important and comprehensive statutory provisions. In terms 
section 25 of the ECA, the Minister of Environmental Affairs is empowered to make 
regulations aimed at controlling noise, vibration and shock. Although most of the Act has 
been repealed by the NEMA,74 section 25 still remains in force.75 
 
Apart from conferring the power to make regulations aimed at controlling noise on the 
Minister, section 25 of the ECA also provides that the Minister may: 
(a)  define what is meant by noise;76 
(b)  prevent, reduce or eliminate noise, vibration and shock;77 
(c)  stipulate levels of noise, vibration and shock which may not be exceeded, either in 
general or by specified apparatus or machinery or in specified instances or places;78 
(d)  specify the types of instruments which can be used to determine levels of noise as 
well as the manner in which these instruments must be calibrated and utilised;79 
(e)  confer the power to control and combat noise on provincial and local governments 
and determine the ambit of these powers;80 and 
(f)  deal with any other matter that the Minister deems necessary or expedient to 
effectively control and combat noise.’81 
 
Although section 25 of the ECA confers the power to make regulations aimed at controlling 
noise on the Minister, the concurrent administration of section 25 has been assigned to a 
‘competent authority’ in each provincial government.82  This is usually the Member of the 
Executive Council responsible for environmental affairs.  
 
                                                 
73 73 of 1989. 
74 See (note 3). 
75 Besides section 25 of the ECA, section 152 of the KwaZulu Nature Conservation Act 29 of 1992 and section   
    93 of the Limpopo Environmental Management Act 7 of 2003 confer almost identical powers on the MEC 
    responsible for environmental affairs in each province.  
76 Section 25(a). 
77 Section 25(b). 
78 Section 25(c). 
79 Section 25(d). 
80 Section 25(e). 
81 Section 25(f). 
82 See GN R43 in Government Gazette No. 17354, dated 8 August 1996. 
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The power to make regulations, consequently, is shared between the Minister and the MECs. 
The Minister and the MEC’s power to make such regulations, however, must be read in light 
of the fact that noise pollution is now a functional area of exclusive provincial competence 
listed in Part B of Schedule 5. 
 




Acting in terms of section 25 of the ECA, the Minister of Environmental Affairs has 
promulgated noise control regulations on a number of occasions.  
 
A first set of National Noise Control Regulations was promulgated in 1990,83 a second set in 
199184 and a third set in 1992.85 An important feature of these regulations is that they only 
applied in those municipalities that consented to their application. This is because section 28 
of the ECA provided that regulations which affected a local authority could apply in the area 
of a local authority only if the local authority agreed to this. In other words, they functioned 
as model regulations which could be adopted by a municipality.86  
 
In 1992, however, the ECA was amended and section 28 was repealed. Following this 
amendment, a draft set of new National Noise Control Regulations was published in 1994.87 
In contrast to the earlier regulations, these draft regulations were intended to apply 
throughout the country, unless a local authority applied to be exempted from them. The draft 
regulations, however, have never been formally promulgated. Although no explanation for 
the failure to promulgate these draft regulations has been provided, it is most probably 
because noise pollution is now a functional area of exclusive provincial competence. 
 
                                                 
83 GNR 2544, Government Gazette 12816, 2 November 1990. 
84 GNR 314, Government Gazette 13029, 22 February 1991. 
85 GNR 154, Government Gazette 13717, 10 January 1992. 
86 A list of the municipalities that have adopted these model regulations is set out in P Henderson Environmental 
Law of South Africa Appendix 1 at LA1-LA2A. The model regulations adopted by municipalities in the Free 
State, Gauteng and the Western Cape, however, have been repealed. This is because these provinces have 
adopted their own Provincial Noise Control Regulations as set out below. 
87 GNR 55, Government Gazette 15423, 14 January 1994. 
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The 1992 National Noise Control Regulations deal with various issues pertaining to the 
control of noise. Regulation 2 thus confers the power on local authorities to carry out various 
actions aimed at controlling noise; regulation 3 imposes a general prohibition on certain 
specified activities; regulation 4 prohibits disturbing noises; and regulation 5 prohibits noise 
nuisances. Regulation 6 deals with the use of sound measuring instruments; regulation 7 with 
exemptions from the regulations; and regulation 8 with the attachment of vehicles that are 
causing an offence in terms of the regulations. 
 
Finally, regulation 9 deals with penalties. It provides in this respect that a person who 
contravenes regulation 3, 4 and 5 commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine not 
exceeding R20 000 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years, or both; and, in the 
event of a continuing contravention, to a fine not exceeding R250, or to imprisonment not 
exceeding twenty days, or both, for each day on which the contravention continues.. 
 
Among the most significant concepts dealt with under the regulations are the concept of a 
‘disturbing noise” and the concept of a ‘noise nuisance’. 
 
2.4.2 A disturbing noise 
 
A disturbing noise is defined in regulation 1 as a ‘noise level that exceeds the zone sound 
level or, if no zone sound level has been designated, a noise level that exceeds the ambient 
sound level at the same measuring point by 7dBA or more’. This is an objective 
measurement. 
 
Ambient sound level is defined in regulation 1 as the ‘reading on an integrating impulse 
sound level meter taken in the absence of any alleged disturbing noise’ and a noise level is 
defined as the ‘reading taken at a measuring point in the presence of any alleged disturbing 
noise at the end of a total period of at least ten minutes after such meter was put into 
operation’. 
 
Insofar as a disturbing noise is concerned, regulation 4 provides that every person is 
prohibited from making, producing or causing a disturbing noise. In addition, regulation 4 
also provides that every person is prohibited from allowing a disturbing noise to be made, 
produced or caused by any other person, animal, machine, device or apparatus.  
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2.4.3 A noise nuisance 
 
A noise nuisance, on the other hand, is defined in regulation 1 as ‘any sound which disturbs 
or impairs or may disturb or impair the convenience or peace of any person’. Unlike a 
disturbing noise, therefore, a noise nuisance is subjectively determined. Insofar as a noise 
nuisance is concerned, regulation 5 provides that every person is prohibited from causing a 
noise nuisance. Regulation 5 goes on to provide, however, that this prohibition only applies 
to those noises caused by the specific activities identified in the regulation.   
 
A wide range of activities are identified in regulation 5 which provides that ‘[n]o person 
shall: 
(a)  cause a noise nuisance, or allow it to be caused, by operating or playing any radio, 
television set, drum, musical instrument, sound amplifier, loudspeaker system or 
similar device producing, reproducing or amplifying sound;88 
(b)  offer any article for sale by shouting or ringing a bell, or by allowing shouting or the 
ringing of a bell, in a manner which may cause a noise nuisance;89 
(c)  allow an animal owned or controlled by him to cause a noise nuisance;90 
(d)  build, repair, rebuild, modify, operate or test a vehicle, vessel or aircraft on residential 
premises, or allow it to be built, repaired, rebuilt, modified, operated or tested, if it 
may cause a noise nuisance;91 
(e)  use or discharge any explosive, firearm or similar device which emits impulsive 
sound, or allow it to be used or discharged, if it may cause a noise nuisance, except 
with the prior consent in writing of the local authority concerned and subject to such 
conditions as the local authority may deem necessary;92 
(f)  on a designated piece of land move about or in a recreational vehicle or exercise 
control over a recreational vehicle, as owner or person in control of the piece of land 
concerned, allow these actions on that piece of land, or in the airspace above, if it may 
cause a noise nuisance;93 
                                                 
88 Regulation 5(a). 
89 Regulation 5(b). 
90 Regulation 5(c). 
91 Regulation 5(d). 
92 Regulation 5(e). 
93 Regulation 5(f). 
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(g)  except in an emergency, emit a sound, or allow a sound to be emitted, by means of a 
bell, carillon, siren, hooter, static alarm, whistle, loudspeaker or similar device, if it 
may cause a noise nuisance;94 
(h)  operate any machinery, saw, sander, drill, grinder, lawnmower, power garden 
implement or similar device in a residential area, or allow it to be operated, if it may 
cause a noise nuisance;95 
(i)  load, unload, open, shut or in any other way handle a crate, box, container, building 
material, rubbish container or similar article, or allow it to be loaded, unloaded, 
opened, shut or handled, if it may cause a noise nuisance;96 
(j)  drive a vehicle on a public road in such a manner that it may cause a noise nuisance.97 
 
2.4.4 The distinction between a disturbing noise and a noise nuisance 
 
Despite the important role they play in the noise control regulations, the distinction between a 
disturbing noise and a noise nuisance appears to have given rise to some difficulty. In Laskey 
v Showzone CC,98 for example, Binns-Ward AJ pointed out that while a disturbing noise may 
or may not, depending on the circumstances, also be a noise nuisance, the reason for the 
potential distinction between a disturbing noise and a noise nuisance is ‘less than clear’. 
  
Kidd, however, argues that the reason why the regulations distinguish between these two 
types of noises is because a disturbing noise is one which is objectively determined, while a 
noise nuisance is one which is subjectively determined.99 If loud music is played in the 
middle of the night in a residential neighbourhood, it might not be loud enough to exceed the 
ambient sound level by 7dBA and thus amount to a disturbing noise, but it could disturb or 
impair the convenience or peace of a neighbour and thus amount to a noise nuisance.100 A 
noise may qualify as a noise nuisance, therefore, without it necessarily being a disturbing 
noise.101 
 
                                                 
94 Regulation 5(g). 
95 Regulation 5(h). 
96 Regulation 5(i). 
97 Regulation 5(j). 
98 2007 (2) SA 48 (C) at 79. 
99 M Kidd ‘Muzzling the Crazy Zebra:  Noise Regulation in Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality v 
Greyvenouw CC 2004 (2) SA 81 (E)’ 2005 SAJELP at 175 




Apart from the points set out above, Freedman argues that the inclusion of the concept of a 
noise nuisance has also extended the ambit of the regulations.102 This is because the inclusion 
of a noise nuisance allows a person to rely on the regulations in those circumstances where he 
or she cannot access (or afford) the technical equipment or scientific expertise necessary to 
determine whether a particular noise is 7dBA above the ambient sound level and thus a 
disturbing noise.103 He argues further that by including the concept of a noise nuisance, the 
ambit of the regulations has been widened, but the way in which this has been achieved is 
open to criticism.104 This is due to the fact that ‘unlike the common law, the regulation does 
not provide that a noise must be unreasonable before it may be classified as a noise 
nuisance’.105The regulation simply provides that it has to disturb or impair the convenience of 
peace of a person. It would appear therefore that the definition of a noise nuisance, is 
unjustifiably biased in favour of a complainant.106  
 
2.5 THE PROVINCIAL NOISE CONTROL REGULATIONS 
 
The 1992 National Noise Control Regulations have been repealed and replaced by provincial 
noise control regulations in three provinces, namely: the Free State;107 Gauteng;108 and the 
Western Cape.109 These provincial noise control regulations are modelled on the national 
noise control regulations and are similar to one another. With one exception, therefore, it is 
unnecessary to discuss them in any detail.  
 
                                                 
102 W Freedman ‘Hear No Evil: Noise pollution, the common law of nuisance and the noise control regulations 




106 Ibid. See also Kidd (note 99) at 176. In this respect it is interesting to note that the Western Cape Department 
of  Environmental Affairs and Development Planning has published Draft Noise Control Regulations (see PN 
14 in Western Cape Extraordinary Provincial Gazette No. 6412, 25 January 2007). Unlike the existing 
regulations, the draft regulations strike a more appropriate balance by providing that a noise must be 
unreasonable before it can be classified as a noise nuisance. Clause 1 of the draft regulations thus states that a 
noise nuisance means ‘any sound which impairs or which may impair the convenience or peace of any 
reasonable person’. 
107 See PN 24 in Free State Provincial Gazette No. 35, 24 April 1998. 
108 See PN 5479 in Gauteng Provincial Gazette No. 75, 20 August 1999. 
109 See PN 627 in Western Cape Provincial Gazette No. 5309, 20 November 1998. 
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The one exception is to be found in the Gauteng Noise Control Regulations which, unlike the 
Free State Noise Control Regulations and the Western Cape Noise Control Regulations, make 
provision for so-called ‘neighbourhood noise watch committees’.110  
 
The Gauteng Regulations begin in this respect by providing that a local authority may publish 
a notice in the Provincial Gazette requesting applications for the establishment of a 
neighbourhood noise watch committee, or any group of individuals, or an organisation may, 
of its own initiative, make application to the local authority concerned to be declared as the 
Neighbourhood Noise Watch Committee for one or more neighbourhood.111 
 
Apart from establishing neigbourhood noise watch committees, the regulations also provide 
that ‘a majority of all residents in any neighbourhood may by agreement lodge draft by-laws 
in relation to any such neighbourhood with the local authority concerned regarding the 
control and reduction of noise nuisance in the neighbourhood, including provisions regarding 
restrictions of certain activities that may lead to noise nuisance at specific times and days’. If 
a person contravenes or does not comply with the by-law, he or she is guilty of an offence.112 
 
Regulation 5 of the Gauteng Noise Control Regulations also gives the neighbourhood noise 
watch committee the power to issue a notice to the infringing party if a by-law has been 
contravened or if there has been a failure to comply therewith.  The notice must be in writing 
and must give the owner, or occupier of the property concerned 14 days to rectify the 
contravention.  
 
If the offending party fails to comply with the notice with the prescribed time, a member of 
the Neighbourhood Noise Watch Committee, or any owner or occupier of any premises in the 
neighbourhood concerned who feels aggrieved thereby, may act as complainant in any 
criminal proceedings instituted against such owner or occupier.113 
 
                                                 
110 Regulations 2-7. 
111 Regulation 2. 
112 Regulation 3. 
113 Regulation 5. 
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Finally, the regulations also provide that the aggrieved person shall have the legal capacity to 
apply to a competent court for a peremptory or prohibitory interdict in connection with the 
contravention of the by-law or failure to comply with a provision of the by-laws.114 
 
The introduction of regulations providing for the formation of Neighbourhood Noise Watch 
Committees and supporting by-laws is indeed innovative and empowering for ordinary 
people who live in these neighbourhoods, and are subjected to noise which impairs the 
peaceful enjoyment of their homes. 
 
It is hoped that these by-laws will be utilised by residents and supported by all the authorities 
necessary for their implementation. If successful, this may provide the impetus for other 
provincial authorities to introduce them in existing regulations, and for those provinces where 
Noise Regulations do not exist, it may be a welcome inclusion if Noise Regulations are ever 
promulgated. 
 
Although the regulations are provincial laws, they are applied by local authorities. In the 
remainder of the country regulations published under the new political dispensation as well as 
local authority by-laws from the old regime have to be considered.115 Insofar as the by-laws 
are concerned, several local authorities have enacted by laws dealing specifically with noise. 
These by-laws define a ‘disturbing noise’ objectively as a noise level exceeding the ambient 
sound level by 7dBA or more.116 This is an objective criterion as it is measured on a sound- 
level meter. ‘It is an offence to cause or permit to be made by any person, machine, animal, 








                                                 
114 Regulation 7. 
115 Glazewski (note44) p 753.  
116 A Semmelink and MA Rabie ‘Noise’ in RF Fuggle and MA Rabie Environmental Concerns in South Africa 








The noise control regulations have been considered by the courts on a few occasions, namely: 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality v Greyvenouw CC;118 Laskey v Showzone CC;119 
University of Pretoria v Partnership, Firm or Association known as Springbok Bar;120 and 
University of Pretoria v Free Fall Trading17 CC t/a Aandklas.121 Each of these judgments 
will be discussed in turn. 
 
2.6.2 Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality v Greyvenouw CC 
 
The facts of this case were as follows. The applicants applied to the High Court for an 
interdict prohibiting the respondent, who owned a restaurant and bar called the Crazy Zebra 
and which was situated in a residential suburb in Port Elizabeth, from carrying on its business 
in an unlawful manner. The applicant based its application on two grounds: first, that the 
respondent used its land in a manner that contravened the applicable zoning conditions and, 
second, that it ran its business in a manner that caused a nuisance either in terms of the 
common law or in terms of the National Noise Control Regulations.122 
 
Insofar as the second ground was concerned, the applicants argued that noise surveys carried 
out by two expert witnesses on three separate days indicated that the noise levels emanating 
from the Crazy Zebra exceeded the ambient sound level by 7dBA or more and thus 
constituted a ‘disturbing noise’ as defined in regulation 1 of the National Noise Control 
Regulations. In addition, these expert witnesses also argued that the noise levels that 
emanated from the Crazy Zebra constituted a noise nuisance in respect of the neighbouring 




                                                 
118 2004 (2) SA 81 (SE). 
119 See  (note 98). 
120 [2011] ZAGPPHC 83 (16 February 2011).  
121 [2011] ZAGPPHC 85 (16 February 2011).  
122 GNR 154, Government Gazette 13717, 10 January 1992.  
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The noise emanating from the Crazy Zebra was particularly problematic, these experts also 
argued, when live bands performed and/or recorded music was played in the outside alfresco 
dining area. This was because it is virtually impossible to soundproof an open area where 
sound waves travel in different directions and there was no barrier between the Crazy Zebra’s 
premises and the complainant's premises which could absorb some of the sound generated by 
the playing of amplified music.123 
 
In their defence, the respondents argued that the noise emanating from the Crazy Zebra was 
not as bad as alleged by the applicants and that it did not cause a noise nuisance either in 
terms of the noise control regulations or the common law. In support of their defence, the 
respondents also relied on two witnesses, one who lived next to the Crazy Zebra and another, 
a businessman who worked in the sound industry.  
 
In delivering judgment, the High Court found that the applicants had discharged the onus of 
establishing that a noise nuisance did exist. The High Court based its decision on the fact that 
evidence and conclusions of the experts engaged by the applicants remained unchallenged, as 
well as on the evidence of the residents attesting to the excessive noise that they had to 
endure. Based on the weight of the evidence provided by the applicants, the High Court 
reached the conclusion that the respondents ran their business in contravention of the Noise 
Control Regulations and as a result caused ‘a noise nuisance on Friday and Saturday nights 
by allowing music to be played at unacceptably loud volumes’.124 
 
The High Court also concluded, based on the evidence of the sound experts, that the sound 
that emanated from the Crazy Zebra was a ‘sound that disturbed and impaired (or may disturb 
or impair) the convenience or peace of the second, third, fourth and fifth applicants, and 
probably of other people living in the area too’.125 The finding of the High Court, therefore, 
was consistent with the definition of a noise nuisance in the regulations, and the conduct of 




                                                 
123 At para 81. 
124 At para 88. 
125 At para 89. 
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2.6.3 Laskey v Showzone CC  
 
The facts of this case were as follows. The applicants, who owned two apartments in an 
apartment block located near to the centre of Cape Town, applied to the High Court for an 
interdict prohibiting the respondent, who owned a restaurant and theatre called On-Broadway 
in a neighbouring building, from causing a disturbing noise and/or noise nuisance as defined 
in the Western Cape Noise Control Regulations.126  
 
The applicants based their claim on the grounds that the noise that emanated from the theatre 
during evening performances exceeded the ambient sound level by 7dBA or more and thus 
constituted a ‘disturbing noise’ as defined in regulation 1 of the Western Cape Noise Control 
Regulations. The High Court granted the interdict. In arriving at this conclusion, the High 
Court had to decide two issues: first, whether the noise did infringe the Regulations; and, 
second, whether the applicants had standing to enforce the Regulations. 
 
Insofar as the first issue was concerned, the High Court began by explaining that a ‘disturbing 
noise’ is defined in a technical manner and is measured as a sound level above a variable 
base, without any reference to its effect on the comfort and convenience of any person. Given 
that the variable base is the prevalent ambient noise level, this means that a much louder 
noise would be required for the noise to qualify as a ‘disturbing noise’ in a busy urban 
environment than in a quiet wilderness area. A ‘disturbing noise’, therefore, is not necessarily 
disturbing in the ordinary sense of the word, or nuisancesome in the sense that a litigant 
would be able to found a claim in the law of nuisance.127 
 
After considering what is meant by the concept of a ‘disturbing noise’, the High Court turned 
to consider concept of a ‘noise nuisance’. A ‘noise nuisance’, the High Court explained in 
this respect, is defined as a ‘sound which disturbs or impairs or may disturb or impair the 
convenience or peace of any person’. It follows, therefore, the High Court explained further, 
that a ‘disturbing noise’, as defined in the regulations, may or may not, depending on the 
circumstances, also be a ‘noise nuisance’. The reasons for the distinction between the two 
concepts, however, the High Court concluded, was not entirely clear.128 
                                                 
126 Regulation 1. 




After making these points, the High Court went on to apply them to the facts and found that 
there was no doubt that the noise made by the respondents was a disturbing noise, and that in 
so doing they had infringed the applicable Noise Control Regulations.  
 
The High Court then turned to consider whether the applicant had standing to enforce the 
Regulations by means of an interdict. Insofar as this issue was concerned, the High Court 
began by explaining that in terms of the common law an individual seeking to protect his or 
her environment must prove a direct interest in proceedings in order to have necessary 
standing to proceed. The High Court pointed out that a person may bring an action to enforce 
a statute that is enacted in the interests of a particular group of people if he or she falls into 
that group. The person may also bring an action to enforce a statute enacted in the interests of 
the general public if he or she has suffered harm due to the infringement of the statute.129  
 
In the present case the High Court concluded that the Noise Control Regulations had been 
enacted in the interests of the general public and consequently the applicants could only 
enforce the Regulations if they could show that they had suffered some harm as a result of the 
infringement of the regulations.130 The applicants would be able to succeed if they could 
show that their right of ownership, more specifically their right to peaceful use and 
enjoyment of their property had been infringed by the noise caused by the respondents. 
Essentially they would be granted the interdict if they could show that the noise made by the 
respondents amounted to a common law nuisance.131 
 
After setting out the common law principles governing nuisance, the High Court applied 
them to the facts and came to the conclusion that the noise in question did amount to a 






                                                 
129 At para 13. 
130 At para 14-17. 
131 At para18. 
132 The aspect of the judgment relating to locus standi to enforce the noise control regulations will be dealt with 
in chapter three. 
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2.6.4  University of Pretoria v Partnership, Firm or Association known as Springbok Bar 
 
The facts of this case were as follows. The applicant owned and operated two student hostels 
called ‘Asterhof’ and ‘Vergeet-My-Nie’. These hostels were located next door to a restaurant 
and bar owned by the respondent called the ‘Springbok Bar’. After the applicant’s students 
complained about the excessive noise emanating from the Bar, the applicant applied to the 
High Court for an interdict prohibiting the respondent from carrying on its business in an 
unlawful manner. The applicant based its application on two grounds: first, that the 
respondent was using its land in a manner that contravened the Pretoria Town Planning 
Scheme; and, second, that it ran its business in a manner that contravened the Gauteng 
Provincial Noise Control Regulations.  
 
Insofar as the first issue was concerned, the High Court found that the business conducted by 
the respondent contravened the Pretoria Town Planning Scheme. This is because the erf on 
which the business was situated was to be used for ‘places of refreshment133, business 
buildings, dwelling units and . . . which are normally associated with a shopping centre and 
create no danger or nuisance of noise, dust . . .’134, and it was quite clear from the facts that 
the Springbok Bar was not a place of refreshment as contended by the respondents and as was 
required in terms of the Town Planning Scheme. Instead, it was being operated illegally as a 







                                                 
133 A place of refreshment is defined in the Pretoria Town Planning Scheme as ‘land and buildings or a part of a 
building used for the preparation, sale and consumption of refreshment on the property such as a restaurant, 
cafe, coffee shop, tea room, tea garden, sports bar, pub, bar, and may include take-aways and a maximum of two 
table games, two dartboards, two electronic games, television screens and soft background music for the 
customers but excludes a place of amusement. The kitchen layout shall comply with the Municipality's health 
regulations’. 
134 At para 25. 
135 A place of amusement is defined in the Pretoria Town Planning Scheme as ‘land and buildings or a part of a 
building used for entertainment purposes such as a theatre, cinema, music hall, concert hall, table games, skating 
rink, dancing, amusement park, casino, electronic games, night club, an exhibition hall or sports arena/stadium 
used for live concerts or performances’. 
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Turning to the second issue, the High Court noted that the Gauteng Noise Control 
Regulations were applicable to the area in which the bar was situated.  The High Court 
referred to the regulation which prohibited a disturbing noise and concluded, that based on an 
acoustics report that formed part of the evidence, that the Springbok Bar was conducted in 
violation of the applicable Noise Control Regulations in that the noise emanating from the 
premises constituted a disturbing noise. The High Court also stated that the noise emanating 
from the premises of Springbok Bar, created an actionable nuisance.136 
 
Based on the evidence contained in the acoustics report and the evidence of the applicant as 
to the effect the noise had on the students who resided in ‘Asterhof’ and ‘Vergeet-My-Nie’, 
the High Court interdicted the respondents from causing and/or making a disturbing noise as 
defined in the Gauteng Noise Control Regulations as well as excessive and/or disturbing 
noise as forbidden in the aforesaid regulations and in associated legislation and the common 
law.137 
 
2.6.5 University of Pretoria v Free Fall Trading17 CC t/a Aandklas 
 
This case was dealt with together with the previous case and the facts are substantially the 
same. The applicant owned and operated two student hostels called ‘Madelief’ and 
‘Magrietjie’. These hostels were located near to a restaurant and bar owned by the respondent 
called ‘Aandklas’. Following complaints from its students, the applicant applied to the High 
Court for an interdict prohibiting the respondent from carrying on its business in an unlawful 
manner. The applicant based its application on two grounds: first, that the respondent was 
using its land in a manner that contravened the Pretoria Town Planning Scheme; and, second, 







                                                 
136 At para 38. 
137 At para 40. 
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Insofar as the first issue was concerned, the High Court found that the business conducted by 
the respondent contravened the Pretoria Town Planning Scheme. This is because the erf on 
which the business was situated was to be used for ‘places of refreshment,138 business 
buildings, dwelling units and . . . which are normally associated with a shopping centre and 
create no danger or nuisance of noise, dust . . .’, and it was quite clear from the facts that the 
Aandklas was not a place of refreshment, but a place of amusement.139 
 
Insofar as the second issue was concerned, the High Court stated that the Gauteng Noise 
Control Regulations were applicable to the area in which the bar was situated.  The court 
referred to the regulation which prohibited a disturbing noise140 and thereafter turned to 
consider an acoustics report pertaining to the noise emanating from Aandklas. The report 
indicated that the noise levels exceeded the laid down norms and was excessive. Based on the 
report and the corroborating evidence of the residents of the hostels, the court found that the 
applicant had conclusively proven an actionable nuisance against the respondent.141 
 
The High Court interdicted the respondents from causing and/or making a disturbing noise as 
defined in the Noise Control Regulations – Gauteng as well as excessive and/or disturbing 










                                                 
138 A place of refreshment is defined in the Pretoria Town Planning Scheme as ‘land and buildings or a part of a 
building used for the preparation, sale and consumption of refreshment on the property such as a restaurant, 
cafe, coffee shop, tea room, tea garden, sports bar, pub, bar, and may include take-aways and a maximum of two 
table games, two dartboards, two electronic games, television screens and soft background music for the 
customers but excludes a place of amusement. The kitchen layout shall comply with the Municipality's health 
regulations’. 
139 At para 26. 
140 At para 21. 
141 At paras 10 and 20. 
142 At para 36. 
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Apart from the regulations made in terms of section 28 of the ECA, noise pollution is also 
regulated by the National Environmental: Air Quality Act143 and a number of sector specific 
statutes or regulations. Among these sector specific statutes and regulations are the Civil 
Aviation Act;144 the Criminal Procedure Act;145 the National Building Regulations and 
Building Standards Act;146 the National Road Traffic Act;147 and the regulations made in 
terms of the Occupational Health and Safety Act.148 
 
 
2.7.2 The National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 
 
The National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act, replaced the Atmospheric 
Pollution Act. Section 34 of the Air Quality Act empowers the Minister of Environmental 
Affairs to prescribe national noise control standards. This may be of a general nature or it 
may be in respect of specified machinery or activities in specified places.149 The application 
of these standards would bind both provincial and local government spheres. 
 
2.7.3 The Civil Aviation Act 
 
The Civil Aviation Act incorporates into South African law the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation.150 In terms of section 155(1)(m)(iv) of the Act the Minister of Transport is 
empowered to make regulations with respect to noise and vibrations caused by air navigation 
and associated activities. 
 
 
                                                 
143 39 of  2004. 
144 13 of 2009. 
145 51 of 1977. 
146 103 of 1977. 
147 93 of 1996. 
148 85 of 1993. 
149 Section 33(1)(a). 
150 Section 2(1). 
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 2.7.4 The Criminal Procedure Act 
 
Section 341 of the Criminal Procedure Act contains a section that applies to vehicular noise. 
The Act makes it an offence to drive a vehicle that is defective or not properly adjusted and 
thus causing a noise, as well as causing undue noise by using a vehicle.151 
 
2.7.5 The National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 
 
Section 17 of the Act provides for the creation of National Building Regulations and 
Directives, which can provide specifications relating to the transmission of sound.152 
 
2.7.6 The National Road Traffic Act 
 
In terms of this Act, the Minister is empowered to create regulations pertaining to ‘excessive 
noise owing to the design or condition of any vehicle or the loading thereof, or to the design, 
condition or misuse of a silencer, or of a hooter, bell or other warning device, when any such 
vehicle is operated on a public road’.153  
 
2.7.7 The Occupational Health and Safety Act 
 
Noise in the work place is governed by regulations made in terms of the Occupational Health 
and Safety Act. In terms of regulation 3 ‘no employer or self-employed person shall require 
or permit any person to enter any workplace under his or her control where such person will 
be exposed to noise at or above the 85dBA noise-rating limit’. The Act also requires an 
employer to provide training on risks to health and safety caused by exposure to noise. The 
employer must also instruct employees on steps that must be taken to protect against the 
health risks associated with the exposure to noise, which includes the wearing and use of 
earplugs and protective earmuffs. The impetus behind the regulations is to ensure that noise 
exposure of employees is minimized. 
 
 
                                                 
151 Schedule 3, par(e) 
152 Section 17(1)(f). 





After a discussion of the legislative framework used to control noise pollution in South 
Africa, the following general observations can be made: 
 
(a)  South Africa has fairly sophisticated and comprehensive statutory provisions in place 
to control noise pollution. The statutory regime governing noise is however, very 
fragmented. This is because legislation governing noise has been passed by all three 
spheres of government. This is not the case in practice, because most of the provincial 
and local statutes governing noise are modelled on the National Noise Control 
Regulations. 
 
(b)  The most significant and comprehensive statutory provisions pertaining to the control 
of noise pollution are contained in section 25 of Environment Conservation Act154, 
which empowers the Minister of Environmental Affairs to make regulations aimed at 
controlling noise; vibration and shock. 
 
(c)  The regulations have created a sophisticated and comprehensive system for dealing 
with noise pollution 
 
(d)  The two most important concepts in the National Noise Control Regulations are the 










                                                 
154 See (note 73). 
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(e)  The Noise Control Regulations have been successfully applied in a few cases in South 
Africa. In respect of the judgment in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality v 
Greyvenouw CC,155 Kidd has argued that the court fails to adequately distinguish 
between a noise nuisance and a disturbing noise. This is a valid criticism and is based 
on the fact that evidence in the judgment also that the noise was a ‘disturbing noise’ 
as well as a ‘noise nuisance’ in terms of the regulations.156 This is a valid criticism 
and may also may also be made in respect of the judgments in the University of 
Pretoria v Partnership, Firm or Association known as Springbok Bar157 and 
University of Pretoria v Free Fall Trading17 CC t/a Aandklas.158 Despite this 
criticism, the finding of the courts in these cases was correct and the interdicts were 
granted. 
 
(f)  In terms of Schedule 5 of the Constitution noise pollution control is a provincial 
function. The administration of these laws is assigned to local authorities. 
 
(g)  Although legislative provisions to deal with noise exist, the most significant challenge 
is the effective implementation of the legislation. I agree with Glazewski who 
proposes that in order to do so it is necessary to build local government capacity in 
this regard because local government is responsible for implementing noise control 
laws.159 
 
(h)  A criticism that may be raised in respect of the judgment in Laskey v Showzone CC,160 
is the fact that the court failed to take into account the provisions of section 38 of the 
Constitution as well as section 32 of the NEMA161 which would have the allowed the 
applicants the necessary standing to enforce the relevant Noise Control Regulations. 




                                                 
155 See (note 118). 
156 See  (note 99) p 174. 
157 See (note 120). 
158 See (note 121). 
159 See (note 44) 754. 
160 See (note 98). 
161 See (note 3). 
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Apart from the statutory provisions that are aimed at controlling noise pollution, a person 
who is suffering from the effects of noise pollution may also rely on a number of different 
areas of the common law for a remedy. Amongst these are administrative law, criminal law, 
the law of delict and the law of property. For the purposes of this dissertation, however, we 
are going to focus on the law of property and, in particular, the law of neighbours. This is 
because most disputes about noise arise in the context of neighbouring landowners. 
 
3.2 THE LAW OF NEIGHBOURS 
 
The law of neighbours is that branch of the South African legal system which is aimed at 
harmonizing the competing interests of neighbouring landowners in a just and equitable 
manner by weighing up their different rights and obligations and imposing restrictions on 
their entitlements as landowners.162 
 
The law of neighbours is divided into: (a) restrictions imposed by the general concept of 
nuisance which have been borrowed largely from English law; and (b) restrictions imposed 
by certain traditional Roman-Dutch remedies aimed at protecting an owner’s full use and 
enjoyment of his or her property.163 
 
The South African law of neighbours, therefore, is derived from both English and Roman-
Dutch law. This is because Roman-Dutch law does not have a general set of principles and 
rules governing relations between neighbours. Instead, Roman-Dutch law consists of a 
combination of remedies which are applicable only in certain specific situations.164  
 
                                                 
162 AJ van der Walt and GJ Pienaar Introduction  to the Law of Property 6ed (2011) p 88. 
163 Ibid. 
164 The specific situations in which the Roman-Dutch remedies are available are: the encroachment of buildings  
     or plants upon land; the removal of lateral or surface support; and the interference with the natural flow of  
      surface water. 
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When faced with a conflict between neighbours that does not fall into one of the specific 
Roman-Dutch remedies, therefore, the South African courts have frequently applied 
principles and rules drawn from the English tort of nuisance. 
 
This does not mean, however, that South African law has simply taken over and adopted the 
whole of the English law of nuisance.  Instead, the South African courts have remodelled the 
principles and rules of the English tort of nuisance so that they conform to the principles of 
South African private law, thus creating a unique and indigenous law of nuisance.165 
 
Modern South African neighbour law is consequently a fragmented system of principles and 
rules which have been drawn from both English law and Roman-Dutch law. Apart from 
being based on both English and Roman-Dutch law, the South African law of neighbours also 
straddles both the law of delict and the law of property. 
 
For example, if a landowner’s bodily integrity is impaired, or if a landowner’s land is 
damaged, as a result of the manner in which a neighbour is using his or her land, then the 
landowner has a remedy in the law of delict. On the other hand, if a landowner’s entitlement 
to use and enjoy his or her land is impaired as a result of the manner in which a neighbour is 
using his or her land, then the landowner has a remedy in the law of property. 
 
3.3 THE LAW OF NUISANCE  
 
The word ‘nuisance’ is derived from the Latin word nocere which means hurt, harm or injury 
and it is defined in modern English as that which causes annoyance, inconvenience, 
discomfort, vexation or harm.166 In the language of the law, however, the word nuisance in its 
broadest sense encompasses at least three different concepts, namely a public nuisance, a 
private nuisance and a statutory nuisance.167 
 
                                                 
165 Where the courts have simply relied on English law in order to decide a case, this has been sharply criticised 
by the Supreme Court of Appeal, particularly in Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1963 (1) SA 102 (A) and 
Williams v Harris 1998 (3) SA 970 (SCA). 




A public nuisance is ‘an act or omission or state of affairs that impedes, offends, endangers or 
inconveniences the public at large’168. A private nuisance is ‘an act or omission or condition 
or state of affairs that materially inconveniences another in the ordinary comfortable use or 
enjoyment of land or premises’.169 And a statutory nuisance is ‘a condition or state of affairs 
which a legislative authority has declared to be a nuisance.’170 
 




As we have already seen, a (private) nuisance is an act or omission or condition or state of 
affairs that materially inconveniences another in the ordinary comfortable use or enjoyment 
of land or premises.171  
 
The concept of a nuisance has also been defined as ‘conduct whereby a neighbour’s health, 
well-being or comfort in the occupation of his or her land is interfered with . . . as well as the 
causing of actual damage to a neighbour’.172 
 
As this definition indicates, South African commentators often draw a distinction between 
two types of nuisance, namely a nuisance in the narrow sense and a nuisance in the wide 
sense.  
 
3.4.2 The concept of a nuisance in the narrow sense 
 
In its narrow sense the concept of a nuisance refers to conduct on the part of a neighbour that 
interferes with a landowner's health, comfort and convenience.173 This is the usual form that a 
nuisance takes and it is commonly referred to as an annoyance.  
 
 





172 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar and H Mostert Silberberg and Schoemann’s The Law of Property 5ed (2006) 111. 
173  See (note 162) p90. 
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A landowner's health, comfort and convenience is usually infringed by the invasion of foul 
odours;174 smoke;175 gas;176 dust;177 noise;178 vibrations;179 and so on. In the past our courts 
have held that noises emanating from by a blacksmith’s workshop;180 a chicken farm;181 a 
restaurant;182 and a music theatre183 amount to an actionable nuisance.  
 
Nuisance in the form of annoyance may amount to either an infringement of a personality 
right or an infringement of the right of ownership.184 
 
An individual’s right of personality includes his or her bodily integrity, dignity, reputation 
and privacy. An infringement of a personality right occurs when the nuisance causes personal 
discomfort. In these circumstances the nuisance amounts to a delict and the landowner would 
have a delictual remedy in the form of the actio injuriarum.185 
 
An infringement of the right of ownership occurs when the nuisance adversely affects a 
landowner’s entitlement to occupy his or her land in personal physical comfort, convenience 
and well-being. In these circumstances the landowner would have property law remedies, 
most probably an interdict.186 
 
3.4.3 The concept of a nuisance in the wide sense 
 
In its wide sense the concept of a nuisance refers to abnormal or unusual use of land by a 
neighbour in terms of which actual damage is caused to a landowner's land or the landowner 
is threatened with potential damage.187 
 
                                                 
174 See Bell v East London Municipality 1928 EDL 354 and Inglethorpe Sackville-West 1908 EDC 159. 
175 See Blacker v Carter (1905) 19 EDC 223. 
176 See Winshaw v Miller and Another 1916 CPD 439. 
177 See Liss Shoe Co (Pty) Ltd v Moffett Building and Contracting Co (Pty) Ltd 1952 (3) SA 484 (W)  
178 See Holland v Scott (1881-1882) 2 EDC 307 and Graham v Dittmann & Son 1917 TPD 288 
179 See Redelinghuis v Silberbauer 1874 Buch 95 and Jecks v O’Meara 1904 TH 284. 
180 See Holland v Scott (1881 – 1882) 2 EDC 307 and Graham v Dittman & Son 1917 TPD 288. 
181 See De Charmoy v Day Star Hatchery (Pty) Ltd 1967 (4) SA 188 (D). 
182 See (note 118) 
183 See (note 98). 
184 Supra (note 166) at para 170. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid. 
187 See (note 162) p90. 
48 
 
In such a case the landowner suffers actual patrimonial loss. Patrimonial loss includes 
expenditure incurred in seeking to prevent the nuisance and the loss arising from material 
damage caused to corporeal property.  
 
In the past our courts have held that allowing oil from a storage tank to seep onto a 
neighbour’s land;188 animals on neighbouring properties being held under unhealthy 
conditions causing unpleasant smells as well as a health risk;189 and planting trees with 
extensive root systems which threatened the foundations of a neighbouring house190 
amounted to actionable nuisances. 
 
A nuisance in the wide sense involves the actual infliction of patrimonial damage.191 The 
focus here is not on personal discomfort or inconvenience but on actual damage to the land. 
In such circumstances compensation can be claimed in terms of the law of delict by means of 
the action for damages, or the infringement can be prohibited by means of an interdict in 
terms of the law of property.192 
 
3.4.4 The test for reasonableness 
  
When it comes to deciding whether the conduct of a neighbour is unlawful and therefore 
constitutes a nuisance the courts have to balance conflicting entitlements: 
 
(a)  The entitlement of a landowner to the free use her land for her own benefit or profit, 
which might include creating odours, or noises or even some damage to a neighbour’s 
land.193 
(b) The entitlement of a neighbour to the peaceful use and enjoyment of his land (“the 




                                                 
188 See Van der Merwe v Carnarvon Municipality 1948 (3) SA 613 (C). 
189 See Whittaker v Hime (1912) 33 NLR 72 and  Van der Westhuizen  v Du Toit 1912 CPD 184. 
190 See Bingham v Johannesburg City Council 1934 WLD 180. 
191 See (note162) p91. 
192 Ibid p90. 




The conduct of a landowner will only be unlawful and as a result be actionable as a nuisance 
if that conduct is unreasonable.195 The test is not that of a reasonable person, rather it is an 
objective evaluation of the circumstances in which the interference has taken place. It is a test 
for unlawfulness or wrongfulness.196 
 
The question that must be answered is whether a normal person finding him or herself in the 
position of the plaintiff, would have tolerated the interference in question.197 In order to 
answer this question a court must take into account various factors. These factors are usually 
divided into two categories: (a) those related to the seriousness of the harm;198 and (b) those 
related to the utility of the conduct which caused the harm.199 
 
3.4.5  Criteria relating to the seriousness of the harm 
 
The factors that are usually taken into account when the courts consider the seriousness of the 
harm are as follows:  
‘(a)  the extent of the interference;  
(b)  the locality of the land;  
(c)  the suitability of the plaintiff’s use; 
(d)  the time the interference took place; 
(e)  the duration of the interference; 
(f)   the sensitivity of the plaintiff to the harm; and 
(g)  the possibility of mitigating the harm.’200 
 
















(a) The extent of the interference 
 
In order to be considered unreasonable the harm suffered must be substantial and therefore 
harm which is trifling is not unreasonable.201 The test is an objective one and is expressed as 
the test of what a normal person residing in the area would consider to be an excessive or 
intolerable interference.202 A normal person is defined as one who is not over-scrupulous or 
finicky or sensitive, but a normal person of ‘sound and liberal tastes and habits.’203 
 
(b) The locality of the land 
 
There is no universal standard of comfort of  the comfort human existence and what may be 
unreasonable in one area may not be unreasonable in another.204 This is because different 
areas are devoted to different uses (agricultural, commercial, industrial, residential and so 
on). Different levels of tolerance, therefore, apply to different areas. A person living in an 
urban area, for example, cannot expect the peace and quiet of a rural area.205 
 
(c) The duration of the interference 
 
The seriousness of the harm suffered by the plaintiff will usually be determined by the 
duration of the interference with his or her comfort.206 An interference must persist for a 
significant period of time in order for it to be considered unreasonable.207 An occasional 







                                                 
201 Ibid at para 174. 









(d) The time the interference took place 
 
The seriousness of the harm suffered by the plaintiff will also be determined by considering 
the time of day or night at which the interference occurs.209 An interference which is 
reasonable at midday may not be reasonable at midnight.210 An interference with sleep is 
usually considered to be more serious than one that does not.211 
 
(e) The suitability of plaintiff’s use 
 
How suitable the locality is for the uses that plaintiff devotes the land or premises to, will also 
be an important factor that will be considered in determining the seriousness of the harm 
suffered.212 In circumstances where a plaintiff chooses to use the land or premises in manner 
which is inappropriate to the locality, the plaintiff will be required to tolerate more 
interference with his comfort than he would in a locality which was appropriate for the use to 
which he put the land.213 
 
(f)  Avoidance or mitigation of the harm 
 
The seriousness of the harm may be affected by the extent to which the landowner could have 
taken steps to avoid or mitigate the harm suffered.214 If the harm could have been 
inexpensively or easily avoided or lessened by the landowner, it will be considered less 








                                                 
209 Ibid at para 178. 
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(g)  The plaintiff’s sensitivity to harm 
 
In order to determine the gravity of the harm suffered, the standard used is that of the 
ordinary person living in that area. If the plaintiff is extraordinarily sensitive to the activity 
carried on by the defendant, the interference will not be considered unreasonable.216 This 
applies to both the physical and moral sensitivity of the plaintiff.217 
 
3.4.6  Criteria relating to the utility of the conduct causing the harm 
 
The factors that are usually taken into account when the courts consider the utility of the 
conduct that caused the harm are as follows: 
 
‘(a)  the nature of the activity; 
(b)  the motive or purpose of the defendant; 
(c)  the practicability of preventing harm occurring.’218 
 
Each of these will be considered in turn below. 
 
(a) The nature of the activity 
 
If the activity or conduct which causes the harm has a utility which outweighs the harm 
suffered, the interference will not be considered to be unreasonable.219 In appropriate 
circumstances the harm arising out of a nuisance caused by normal land-use activities may 
have to be tolerated as a part of living together in society.220 The social utility of the land is 
based on a common sense approach and as a general rule the use of the land for promoting 
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(b) The motive or purpose of the defendant 
 
If the defendant, by engaging in a particular activity, has the intention to harm his neighbours 
or acts out of malice or spite, the resulting interference and harm inflicted on the plaintiff will 
be considered unreasonable.222 
 
(c) The practicability of preventing harm 
 
The greater the possibility of preventing the harm the more likely it is that the harm is 
unreasonable.223 Therefore if an interference could have been prevented or at least lessened 
by the defendant carrying on the activity at a different place or in a different manner, or with 
more skill is more likely to be considered an unreasonable interference than one which could 
not have been prevented by such measures.224 A defendant is, however, only expected to take 
steps which are reasonable to implement and thus prevent the harm being caused.’225 
 




A landowner who has been harmed or threatened with harm by a nuisance has the following 
remedies: (a) self-help; (b) an abatement order; (c) an action for damages; and (d) an 




This remedy allows a landowner in the most urgent cases of necessity to take the law into his 
or her own hands. “The circumstances in which self-help is permissible include ‘an imminent 
risk to health or circumstances so pressing as to admit of no delay in abating the nuisance”.226 
                                                 
222 Ibid at para 183. 
223 Ibid at para 185. 
224 Ibid. 
225 Ibid. 
226 Ibid at para 196 
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It is clear, therefore, that self-help is only justifiable in limited and exceptional 
circumstances.227 
 
3.5.3 An abatement order 
 
This remedy relates to conditions defined as nuisance by legislation. In terms of the relevant 
legislation, public officers are authorised to order persons responsible for causing the 
nuisance, to abate same on their premises.228 If a victim is suffering the effects of nuisance 
from a neighbouring landowner, he or she must apply to the local authority for an order of 
abatement to be issued against the offending party.229 
 
3.5.4 An action for damages 
 
An action for damages can lie in respect of a nuisance where the nuisance has caused actual 
patrimonial loss.230 There is no certainty as to whether the action may be brought under the 
actio legis Aquiliae or under some other form of liability.231 The victim of nuisance may 
recover damages arising from:  
‘(a)  expenditure incurred in seeking to prevent the interference with the comfort of human 
existence caused by the nuisance;  
(b)  the loss arising from material damage caused by the nuisance;  
(c)  depreciation in the value of immovable property which is permanent and not merely 
of the sort that will disappear with the removal of the nuisance.’232 
 






                                                 
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid at para 197. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Ibid at para 202. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Ibid at para 204. 
233 Ibid at para 205. 
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An interdict is a court order in terms of which a person is instructed to either do something 
(mandatory interdict) or to stop doing something (prohibitory interdict). The purpose of an 
interdict is to stop an on-going infringement of property rights or to prevent an imminent 
infringement.234 It cannot be granted once the infringement had stopped. 
 
The application for an interdict usually takes place in two stages: first an interim (temporary) 
interdict is granted and then later a final (permanent) interdict is granted.235 An interim 
interdict is usually granted at short notice and on an urgent basis, while a final interdict is 
granted only after both parties have been given a proper opportunity to prepare and present 
their cases. 
 
(b) An interim interdict 
 
A person who applies for an interim interdict must prove the following requirements : 
‘(i)  a prima facie right; 
(ii)  apprehended harm which may be irreparable; 
(iii)  a balance of convenience; and 
(iv)  the absence of a satisfactory alternative remedy.’236 
 
The first requirement is met when the applicant proves the probability that an actionable 
nuisance exists.237 In order to determine this, the court will look at whether the applicant is 
suffering from nuisance which is unreasonable. This will be determined in accordance with 
the factors set above.  
 
 
                                                 
234 Ibid at para 198. 
235 Ibid at para 199. 




Insofar as the second requirement is concerned, the applicant must show that if the order is 
refused, he or she will suffer irreparable harm.238 The harm suffered would be that which 
could not normally be assessed in monetary terms. This would include: annoyance, mental 
distress, or discomfort, which are usually caused by nuisance and cannot be quantified in 
monetary terms.239 A threat of harm to the life or physical health of the person would also be 
considered as irreparable harm.240 
 
Insofar as the third requirement is concerned, the court must be satisfied that the granting of 
the interdict will not cause greater harm to the respondent or the general public welfare in 
relation to what the applicant complains of.241  Before the court determines a nuisance to be 
actionable the interests of the victim and perpetrator must be considered.242 
 
The final requirement places a burden on the victim to show that the granting of the interdict 
is the only effective relief to the nuisance and additionally, that an award for damages would 
not provide the same relief.243 Whether or not the interdict will be granted, despite the 
applicant having established the requisite requirements, is still within the discretion of the 
court.244 
 
(c) A final interdict 
 
A person who applies for a final interdict must prove: 
‘(i)  a clear right; 
(ii)  injury committed or apprehended; and 
(iii)  the absence of a satisfactory alternative remedy.’245 
 
The plaintiff is required to prove on a balance of probabilities that he has a clear or definite 
legal right. In the case of a nuisance he must show that he or she is the owner of the land or is 
lawfully vested with legal rights of use and enjoyment.246  
                                                 











In relation to the second requirement, the plaintiff must show that his or her legal right has 
been infringed by the defendant to his or her prejudice, this could be an actual or potential 
prejudice.247 In nuisance matters it is required that the plaintiff establish that the defendant’s 
conduct constitutes an actionable nuisance.248 Finally, the plaintiff must also establish that the 
final interdict is the only form of relief and that no other adequate remedy exists.249 
 




In certain circumstances a defendant cannot be held liable for a nuisance. These are: 
‘(a)  statutory authority; 
 (b)  a servitude; and  
 (c)  coming to the nuisance.’250 
 
A defendant may raise these defences where a nuisance has been found to be actionable. 
 
3.6.2 Statutory authority 
 
This is where a statue authorises the infliction of the harm caused by the nuisance.251 The 
power conferred by the statute, however, must be exercised so as to take all reasonably 
practicable measures to ensure that the harm inflicted is minimised.252 The defence will fail if 
these measures are not taken into account.253 
 
3.6.3  A servitude 
 
This is where a valid servitude authorises the carrying of a particular activity in a manner that 
amounts to a nuisance.254 




250 Ibid at para 207. 
251 Ibid at para 208. 
252 Ibid. 
253 Ibid. 
254 Ibid at para 209. 
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3.6.4 Coming to the nuisance 
 
This is where the applicant has voluntarily set up residence on premises within the vicinity of 
the nuisance. This defence is not usually accepted by the courts.255 This is because prior 
occupation does not relieve the landowner of the duty of using his or her land in a reasonable 
manner.256 
 




As the discussion set out above indicates, when it comes to determining whether a particular 
noise is unlawful and therefore a nuisance, the courts have to determine whether it is 
unreasonable or not and when it comes to determining whether a noise is unreasonable or not 
they take into account a variety of factors. The manner in which the courts go about 
performing this task is clearly illustrated in the following cases: Prinloo v Shaw;257 De 
Charmoy v Day Star Hatcheries (Pty) Ltd;258 Gien v Gien;259 and Lasky v Showzone CC.260 
Each of these cases is discussed in turn below. 
 
3.7.2 Prinsloo v Shaw 
 
The facts of this case were as follows. The applicant, who owned a house in a residential 
suburb in East London, applied for an interdict prohibiting the respondent, who owned the 
neighbouring property and who was the leader of a religious group known as the Latter Rain 
Assemblies, from committing a nuisance by conducting religious services in his house 
accompanied by very loud and strident chanting, clapping, groaning, praying, singing, yelling 
and whining.261  
                                                 
255 Ibid at para 210. 
256 Howard Farrar, Robinson and Co v East London Municipality (1908) EDC 149 and Laskey  v Showzone CC 
2007 (2) SA 59 (C). 
257 1938 AD 570. 
258 See (note 181). 
259 1979 (2) SA 1113 (T). 
260 See (note 98). 
261 At 571. 
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Apart from being very noisy, the facts showed that these religious services were held three 
times a day on three days of the week and four times a day on the remaining four days of the 
week. In addition, the facts also showed that these noisy religious services took place 
between six am and ten pm each day. Besides using the house for religious purposes, the 
respondent also used it for residential purposes. 
 
The key issue that the Appellate Division had to determine was whether the noise in question 
materially interfered with the ordinary comfort and convenience of the occupiers of the 
applicant’s house and diminished their ordinary comfort and convenience.262 The Court found 
that it did and granted the interdict. 
 
In arriving at this decision, the Appellate Division began by stating that ‘[a] resident in a 
town, and more particularly a resident in a residential area, is entitled to the ordinary comfort 
and convenience of his home, and if owing to the actions of his neighbour he is subjected to 
annoyance or inconvenience greater than that to which a normal person must be expected to 
submit in contact with his fellow-men, then he has a legal remedy’.263 
 
The standard which must be adopted in these sorts of cases, the Appellate Division stated 
further, is not ‘the standard not of the perverse or finicking or over- scrupulous person’. 
Instead, it is the standard of a ‘normal man of sound liberal tastes and habits’.264 
 
 
After setting out these principles, the Appellate Division turned to apply them to the facts. In 
this respect the Court began by pointing out, first, that the religious services were conducted 
on the premises of the respondent in close proximity to the premises of the applicant; second, 
that the religious services took place between three or four times daily and were always 
accompanied by the stamping of feet and loud clapping; and, third, that the noise could be 
heard more than 200 feet away. Given these fact, the Court concluded it was quite clear that 
the applicant’s peaceful and undisturbed use and occupation of his property was unduly 
interfered with.265  
 
                                                 






3.7.3 De Charmoy v Day Star Hatchery (Pty) Ltd 
 
The facts of this case are as follows. The plaintiff applied for an interdict prohibiting the 
respondent, who owned the neighbouring property and who carried on the business of 
breeding and raising chickens on its property, from committing a nuisance by switching on 
the lights in the hatchery at 2h30 in the morning, following which approximately 7000 
chickens would be woken up and would begin to cackle and crow very loudly.266 
 
As a result of the noise caused by the chickens, the applicant’s wife’s sleep was disturbed and 
her nerves and general health began to deteriorate. The structures housing the chickens were 
situated very close to her bedroom window and if she left the windows open at night she was 
usually woken at 2.30 am. Due to these factors she was compelled to seek medical advice and 
was prescribed medication to sedate and tranquillise her.  
 
The adjoining properties were also located in a relatively quiet rural area.The Court granted 
the interdict. In arriving at a decision, the Court approved the dictum of Steyn in Regal v 
African  Superslate267 and restated the  Roman-Dutch principle that although an owner may 
normally do as he pleases on his land, his neighbour has a right of enjoyment of his land. If 
one of the neighbouring land owners uses his land in such a way that material interference 
with the other’s rights of enjoyment results, the latter is entitled to relief.268  
 
The Court pointed out that the difficulty in cases such as these was in ‘determining the level 
at which a disturbance which results from the contiguity of two properties, each of which is a 
potential source of disturbance to the other ceases to be a “to- be-expected-in-the-
circumstances” interference with the rights of the enjoyment of property an becomes an 
unwarranted and actionable interference. It is also a question of fact and of judgment and 
opinion, but there are guiding considerations which should be borne in mind in the interests 
of fairness to both parties’.269 
 
                                                 
266 In the opinion of an expert called by the defendant, the light acted as an ovarian stimulant and in response to 
the artificial lighting the egg laying of the hens became more consistent and followed a uniform pattern which in 
turn stimulated the business of the defendant as prices were more consistent when production was steady and 
consistent (at 190A-C).  
267 1963 (1) SA 102 (A). 
268 See (note 181) at 191F. 
269 Ibid at 192C. 
61 
 
The Court then turned to consider the material factors in determining whether a nuisance was 
actionable and stated as follows:  
 
‘The factors which have been regarded as material in determining whether the 
disturbance is of a degree which renders it actionable, include (where the disturbance 
consists in noise) the type of noise, the degree of its persistence, the locality involved 
and the times when the noise is heard. The test, moreover, is an objective one in the 
sense that  not the individual reaction of a delicate or highly sensitive person who 
truthfully complains that he finds the noise to be intolerable is to be decisive, but the 
reaction of “the reasonable man” – one who, according to ordinary standards of comfort 
and convenience, and the without any peculiar sensitivity to the particular noise , would 
find it, if not quite intolerable, a serious impediment to the ordinary and reasonable 
enjoyment of his property.’270 
 
In this judgment the Court reaffirmed the fact that the test is an objective one, and concluded 
that the noise caused by the defendant company in pursuance of its business activities 
unreasonably interfered with the rights of the plaintiff to enjoy his property and granted the 
order sought. 
 
3.7.4 Gien v Gien 
 
The facts of this case were as follows. The applicant applied for an interdict prohibiting the 
respondent, who was his brother and who owned the adjoining property in a rural cattle-
farming district, from committing a nuisance by erecting an apparatus called a ‘Purivox’ on 
his farm which chased away wild animals and birds from his vegetable garden by making 
loud noises.  
 
The facts showed that this apparatus not only made loud explosive noises, but was also 
configured so that it worked day and night. The effect was that the noises disturbed and 
interrupted the sleep of people in the house and caused the animals of the applicant great 
distress. One example of the effect on the animals was that of a normally tame horse, who 
threw its rider when it heard the sound. It was only possible to control the horse when it was 
removed from the farm. 
                                                 




The applicant also contended that the cattle were affected by the noises in that they appeared 
to be restless and became problematic when they had to be dipped. In general, the apparatus 
caused disturbance to his peace and enjoyment of his property and given the effect on his 
animals, was also affecting his farming business. Ultimately, this was causing the applicant 
financial loss. Although it was possible for the respondent to switch off the apparatus during 
the night, or muffle the sound of it without reducing the efficacy, the respondent refused to do 
so. The stance adopted by the respondent was that he was simply doing on his property what 
was necessary to protect his property. He also stated that he was not under an obligation to 
modify his lawful actions simply to accommodate the neighbouring landowner.271 
 
In delivering the judgment, the court cited with approval the dictum of Steyn CJ in Regal v 
Superslate,272 acknowledging that ownership is the most extensive rights that one may have 
with regard to a thing.273  The exercising of this very powerful right must be done in a 
manner so as to take into account the rights of adjoining land owners. The court found that 
the respondent had unlawfully infringed the applicant's rights as owner of the adjoining 
property and granted the interdict. 
 
In handing down the judgment the court approved the standard of reasonableness as 
expounded in Prinsloo v Shaw.274 Essentially that standard of reasonableness is an objective 
standard. The court also approved the factors relevant to determining reasonableness in the 









                                                 
271 Ibid at 1119E. 
272 See (note 267). 
273 Ibid at 1120H. 
274 See (note 257). 
275 See (note 181). 
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3.7.5 Laskey v Showzone CC 
 
The facts of this case were as follows. The applicants were the owners of residential 
apartments situated in a mixed business/residential area in the Cape Town CBD. The 
respondent conducted a theatre-restaurant business known as ‘On- Broadway’ in the 
adjoining building. The complaint was based on the unacceptable levels of noise that 
emanated from the theatre. The main source of the complaint was the amplified sound during 
performances. As a result of the unbearable noise the applicants sought an interdict to restrain 
the respondents from contravening the Western Cape Noise Control Regulations276 , in that 
the noise emanating from On-Broadway constituted a disturbing noise as envisaged by the 
Regulations. The applicants asked the court to interdict the respondents from causing a 
disturbing noise and/or a noise nuisance.277 
 
The interdict was granted by the court.  In arriving at this decision, the Court explained that 
the applicant would only be entitled to enforce the Regulations if he could show that the noise 
made by respondent amounted to a nuisance. Essentially the applicants had to show that their 
right of ownership and more specifically, their right to peaceful use and enjoyment of their 
property had been infringed as a result of the noise made by the respondents. The court went 
on to explain ( and in this respect echoed the various judgments set out above), that a 
landowner is entitled to use his property as he likes, provided he does not unreasonably 











                                                 
276 The Western Cape Noise Regulations have been discussed in chapter two, p 20; 23 & 24. 
277 The concepts of a ‘disturbing noise’ and a ‘noise nuisance’ have been discussed in chapter two, p 20 – 22. 
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In order to determine whether a landowner’s use is reasonable or not, the Court then set out 
and explained the factors that must be taken into account to determine this. The character of 
the area being an important consideration. The court stated as follows : 
 
‘Ignoring for the moment the effect of various regulatory systems that characterise life in 
the modern age, such as zoning controls, building regulations and the like, everyone is in 
general permitted in common law to use their property for any purpose they choose, 
provided only that the use of property should not intrude unreasonably on the use and 
enjoyment by the neighbours of their properties. What constitutes reasonable usage in 
any given case is dependent on various factors, including the general character of the 
area in question – persons living and working in an urban area would, for example, 
reasonably be expected in general, to be more forbearing about a higher level of noise 
intrusion into their lives than neighbours living in a rural housing estate. Social utility is 
another factor that might affect what owners and occupiers of property might reasonably 
be expected to put up with from their neighbours: aircraft and railway trains are an 
unavoidable incident of modern life and it is necessary for their functioning that airports 
and shunting yards should be able to operate. The operation of these facilities will often 
generate higher levels of noise than persons in residential area might in other 
circumstance be reasonably expected to endure, but because of their social utility person 
living near an airport or a railway yard will be required to put up with the associate noise 
levels, as uncomfortable as that might be, provided only that the airport or railway yard 
is not itself operated unreasonably, in a nuisancesome manner’.278  
 
The court thereafter clarified that the test for reasonableness is not the test of the reasonable 
man, but rather an objective assessment of the circumstances in which the alleged nuisance 
occurred and made the following points: 
 
‘Reasonableness in this context is a variable criterion dependent on the circumstances. 
The test for determining whether or not a particular usage or conduct is actionably 
nuisancesome has been aptly expressed by Prof JRL Milton as follows: 
 
“The determination of when an interference so exceeds the limits of expected toleration 
is achieved by invoking the test of what, in the given circumstances, is reasonable. The 
criterion used is not that of the reasonable man, but rather involves an objective 
evaluation of the circumstances and milieu in which the alleged nuisance has occurred. 
                                                 
278 See (note 98) at para 19.  
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The purpose of such evaluation is to decide whether it is fair or appropriate to require the 
complainant to tolerate the interference with the comfort of his existence or whether the 
perpetrator ought to be compelled to terminate the activities giving rise to the harm”. 
 
Lord Wright’s description of the test in Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callahghan and Others 
[1940] AC 880 at 903 was crisper, but to the same effect: 
 
“A balance has to be maintained between the right of the occupier to do what he likes 
with his own, and the right of the neighbour not to be interfered with. It is impossible to 
give any precise or universal formula, but it may broadly be said that a useful test is 
perhaps what is reasonable according to the ordinary usage of mankind living in society, 
or more correctly, in a particular society”.’279 
 
 
After the court set out and explained the factors relevant in determining reasonableness, the 
court then turned to consider the facts of the case at hand. The court concluded, after applying 
these factors to the facts of the case,  that the noise that the respondents made amounted to an 
actionable nuisance. The court highlighted the following factors as the reasons for the 
decision: 
 
(a) It was shown by the evidence of an expert that the increase in noise caused by the shows 
held at On-Broadway was significant. This evidence corroborated the evidence of the 
applicants that the comfort of their existence was materially affected280  
 
(b) The noise made by the shows held at On-Broadway did interfere with the use and 
enjoyment of  the applicant’s property (even though they closed their windows it did not 
help);  
 
(c) Although the performances were short-lived, normally between one and a half and two 
hours per evening, they took place on a regular basis and occurred late at night; when most 
people would expect it be quieter; and 
 
                                                 
279 Ibid at para 20. 
280 Ibid at para 37.  
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(d) finally, the respondent had failed to take any suitable steps to lessen the amount of noise 
being made at its premises, for instance it had failed to properly sound-proof its roof and 
walls.281 
 
The defence raised by the respondents was that the applicants were not entitled to complain 
due to the fact that they had ‘come to the nuisance’. This was based on the fact that the 
premises used by On Broadway had been used as ‘a place of night-time entertainment’ for 
approximately 40 years.  
 
The court rejected this defence based on the fact that ‘prior occupation’ does not release a 
landowner from the obligation of exercising his entitlements in a reasonable manner. The 
court highlighted that fact that even in a commercial area, a landowner is not permitted to 
make a noise which an ordinary or normal person located in that area would regard as being 
unreasonable.282 
 
‘The respondent contends that the applicants are not entitled to complain because the  
premises now occupied by On-Broadway had been used for the best part of 40 years as 
‘a place of night-time entertainment’ at which music had been played, one assumes at 
comparable volumes to that experienced by the applicants today, and because they had 
‘come to the nuisance’. The contention proceeds that there are many restaurants and bars 
in the area and that having regard to the established character of the area the business of 
On-Broadway ‘is being appropriately carried on at 88 Shortmarket Street, and in the 
circumstances constitutes the reasonable and natural use of those premises’, whereas the 
applicants’ use of 74 Loop Street for residential purposes ‘is inappropriate to its 
locality’.283 
 
The court also noted that the area where the theatre was located was no longer a purely 
commercial area. While at one stage it was used purely for commercial purposes, the 
preceding ten years had seen drastic transformation. The area had become a place where 
people both lived and worked in. The respondent was therefore not entitled to make a noise 
which an ordinary or normal person living in a mixed commercial/residential would consider 
to be unreasonable. 
                                                 
281 At paras 33-39. 





‘A person setting up home in the inner city cannot expect the tranquillity of life in the 
leafy suburbs, but in the context of the realities of an urban environment, including the 
phenomenon of a concentration of places of night time entertainment that is part and 
parcel of the 24-hour living city concept, such a person is still entitled to expect that his 
or her neighbour, whatever its character, will use its property in such a manner so as not 
unreasonably to intrude on the ordinary amenities of the inner-city resident. While 
established noise levels are certainly a consideration in assessing what the new class of 
inner-city apartment dwellers might reasonably be expected to tolerate, it cannot be an 
absolute answer for somebody responsible for creating a level of noise which exceeds 
what the inner-city resident should reasonably be expected to tolerate at night to say 
simply, ‘I was making this noise before you moved in and therefore if you wish to live 
here you will just have to put up with it, or find a home elsewhere’. If an area is suitable 
for residential occupation, or has been popularly adopted for that use, other users of 
property in the area must be accommodating of the rights of such residents to the 
reasonable amenities of life’.284 
 
The court recognised and accepted that inner-city dwellers must accept higher levels of noise 
than in other areas. However they should not have to tolerate every type of noise or 
disturbance. It could well be the case that the  pre-existing noise levels  could very well 
exceed what can reasonably be tolerated even in that area. ‘ The contextual application of the 
reasonableness and normal use principles means that a person who moves into an area should 
be relatively tolerant of the levels of noise that may be customary there, but the mere fact of 
prior existence would not justify the disturbance automatically’ 285 
 
3.8  CONCLUSION 
 
As the cases discussed in this chapter show the particular factors the courts will take into 
account in order to determine whether a noise is unreasonable and therefore a nuisance turns 
largely on the facts of each case. In Prinsloo v Shaw, for example, the Court appears to have 
relied heavily on the location of the property, the degree of persistence of the noise and the 
distance at which the noise could be heard and in De Charmoy v Day Star Hatcheries (Pty) 
Ltd the Court appears to have relied on the location of the property, the time at which the 
                                                 
284 At para 26. 
285 AJ van der Walt The Law of Neighbours (2010) 289. 
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noise was made and the seriousness of the harm caused by the noise.  Somewhat similarly, in 
Gien v Gien, the Court appears to have relied on the location of the property, the social utility 
of the noise and the motive of the defendant and in Lasky v Showzone the Court relied on the 
fact that the area where the theatre was located was no longer purely a commercial area. 
 
An important consequence of the common law approach of dealing with noise is that while it 
is very flexible, and may therefore be adapted to the circumstances of each case, it is also 
very uncertain. From this point of view, the common law may not be adequate in dealing with 
the difficulties of the industrialised twenty- first century society we live in and the need exists 
for a more objective way of dealing with the problem of noise.286It must also be appreciated 
that using the common law as a means of controlling noise pollution can be relatively 
burdensome and costly as the litigants must themselves, out of necessity, approach a court for 
relief.  
 
It is, accordingly, not entirely surprising that the legislature has intervened and adopted more 
precise and scientific standards.287 In particular section 25 of the Environment Conservation 
Act288 empowering Provincial Legislatures to put in place Noise Control Regulations which 
must be implemented by municipalities to ensure that noise is controlled. If noise control 
legislation exists in a municipality, the responsibility of pursuing an action against the 
individual creating the noise rests on the municipality concerned. This effectively removes 









                                                 
286 J Glazewski Environmental Law in South Africa 2ed (2005) p610. 
287 See the discussion of the Noise Control Regulations promulgated in terms of the Environment Conservation 
Act in Chapter  two. 
288 See (note 73).  
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The two previous chapters have focussed on the control of noise from a statutory and 
common law perspective. This chapter focusses on the control of noise from a Bill of Rights 
perspective. The South African Constitution contains a number of rights which may be 
infringed by excessive noise. Among these are the right to freedom and security of the 
person;289 the right to a healthy environment;290 and the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of 
property.291  
 
The most significant, however, is the right to a healthy environment. This is because it 
provides not only that everyone has a the right “to an environment that is not harmful to their 
health and well-being”,292 but also that everyone has the right “to have the environment 
protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and 
other measures that [inter alia] prevent pollution”.293 Section 24 thus appears to impose a 
negative obligation on the state to refrain from causing noise pollution and a positive 
obligation to take steps to prevent third parties from causing noise pollution and to create a 
noise pollution free environment. 
 
Before turning to consider the scope and ambit of this right and in particular the extent to 
which it may be infringed by excessive noise, however, it will be helpful to examine the 
scope and ambit of the right of respect for privacy and family life guaranteed in Article 8 of 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(‘the Convention’). This is because the European Court of Human Rights (the ‘ECHR’) has 
held on a number of occasions that Article 8 applies not only to physical invasions of a 
person’s home, but also to non-physical invasions such as noise. 
 
 
                                                 
289 Section 12. 
290 Section 24.  
291 Section 25(1).  
292 Section 24(a).  
293 Section 24(b)(i).  
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The Convention was adopted in 1950 and came into force in 1953. It has 47 member states 
and gives practical form to certain of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.294 It is divided into three sections.  The fundamental rights and 
freedoms protected by the Convention are set out in Section I.295 Section II establishes the 
European Court of Human Rights and sets out its operational rules.296 Section III contains a 
number of miscellaneous provisions.297 
 
Among the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed in Section I of the Convention are:  
 the right to life (Article 2); 
 the right not to be tortured (Article 3); 
 the right not to be held in slavery (Article 4);  
 the right to liberty and security of the person (Article 5);  
 the right to a fair trial and access to court (Article 6);  
 the right not to be punished without a law (Article 7); 
 the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8);  
 the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9);  
 the right to freedom of expression (Article 10);  
 the right to freedom of assembly and association (Article 11);  
 the right to marry (Article 12);  
 the right to an effective remedy (Article 13); and  
                                                 
294 Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom 
(see Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Chart of 
Signatures and Ratifications 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=10/01/2014&CL=ENG 
accessed on 28 January 2014).   
295 Article 2-18. 
296 Article 19-51. 
297 Article 52-59. 
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 the right not to be discriminated against (Article 14).298 
 
Apart from the fundamental rights and freedoms set out above, a number of other 
fundamental rights and freedoms are set out in various Protocols to the Convention. Among 
these are the following: 
 the right to property (Article 1 of Protocol 1); 
 the right to education (Article 2 of Protocol 1);  
 the right to free elections (Article 3 of Protocol 1); 
 the right not to be imprisoned for debt (Article 1 of Protocol 4); 
 the right to freedom of movement (Article 2 of Protocol 4); 
 the right of nationals not to be expelled (Article 3 of Protocol 4); and 
 the right of aliens not to be collectively expelled (Article 4 of Protocol 4).299 
 
As a result of the Convention, human rights have been extended to millions of Europeans due 
largely to the highly effective methods of enforcement through both domestic and 
international mechanisms.300  In terms of Article 1 of the Convention, contracting states are 
required to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the fundamental rights and freedoms 
that are contained in the Convention. Furthermore, in terms of Article 13, these states must 
also ensure that their municipal law provides an effective remedy in cases of infringement. 
The body responsible for the enforcement of the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined 








                                                 
298 European Convention on Human Rights available  at     
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf accessed on 5 December 2013. 
 
299 A number of other rights are also guaranteed in Protocols 6, 7, 12 and 13. Protocol 6 restricts the application  
     of the death penalty to times of war or imminent threat of war; Protocol 7 protects certain procedural rights  
     as well as the right to equality between spouses. Protocol 12 extends the grounds on which a person may not  
     be discriminated against in Article 14 to the exercise of any legal right and the actions of public authorities  
     and Protocol 13 completely abolishes the death penalty. 
300 J Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 3ed (2005)  p332-333 
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4.2.2 The European Court of Human Rights 
 
The ECHR was established in 1959 and is responsible for the enforcement of the Convention. 
Individuals who believe that their fundamental rights and freedoms have been violated, and 
who are unable to successfully remedy their claim through their national legal systems, may 
apply to the ECHR to have their case heard. The ECHR is also empowered to hear cases 
brought by states and may award financial compensation to successful lituigants. A decision 
of the Court will often require changes to national law.301 
 
The ECHR is comprised of 40 judges and normally works in seven-judge chambers. The 
Court is also divided into four sections and also comprises of a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. 
A matter is referred to the Grand Chamber in circumstances where a seven-judge panel has 
concluded that a serious issue of interpretation is involved or that the decision of the panel 
might contravene existing case law. Apart from the parties to each case, the Court’s decisions 
are binding on all signatories as well. 302  
 
Under Article 54 of the Convention, the Committee of Ministers supervises the execution of 
Court judgments. Finally, Article 52 authorises the Secretary General to request parties to 












                                                 
301 JG Merrills ‘European Court of Human Rights’ available at 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/196097/European-Court-of-Human-Rights-ECHR accessed on 5 
January 2014  
302 Ibid 
303 See (note 300)  p 331 - 332 
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4.2.3 Environmental Rights and the Convention 
 
Although the Convention does not make explicit reference to the environment, the ECHR has 
derived “environmental rights” – such as the right to be free from air pollution, from noise 
pollution and from toxic waste – from the fundamental rights and freedoms that are explicitly 
referred to in the Convention. Among these are the right to life (Article 2); the right to private 
and family life (Article 8); and the right to property (Article 1 of Protocol 1). Insofar as noise 
pollution is concerned, however, the most important of these fundamental rights is the right to 
private and family life guaranteed in Article 8.This Article provides as follows: 
 
‘1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ 
 
The purpose behind Article 8 is to protect the private life of individuals against arbitrary 
interference by public officials. In order to ensure that it achieves this purpose, Article 8 is set 
out in very broad terms and encompasses four distinct areas of a person’s life, namely: his or 
her private life; his or her family life; his or her home; and his or her correspondence.304 
 
Like many of the other rights protected in the Convention, Article 8 is a qualified right. The 
first paragraph sets out the content of the right, while the second paragraph sets out the 
specific grounds on which the state may interfere with the private life, family life, home and 
correspondence of an individual. The second paragraph, therefore, is commonly referred to as 
a derogation clause.305 
 
 
                                                 
304 Ivana Roagna Protection the right to respect for private and family life under the European Convention on 
Human Rights: Council of Europe Human Rights Handbook (2012) at 9 available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation accessed on 29 January 2014. 
305 Ursula Kilkelly The right to respect for private and family life: A guide to the implementation of Article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (2003) at 6 9 available at http://refworld.org/pdffid/49f17e212pdf 




In terms of Article 8(2) an interference with a person’s private life, family life, home or 
correspondence must be:  
(a)  lawful;  
(b)  legitimate; and 
(b)  necessary in a democratic society. 
 
An interference will be legitimate if it is aimed at achieving any of the goals set out in Article 
8(2). In other words, an interference will be legitimate if it is aimed at: 
(i)  protecting national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country; 
(ii)  preventing disorder or crime; 
(iii)  protecting health or morals; or 
(iii)  protecting the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
Given the manner in which Article 8 is structured, it is not surprising that the ECHR has 
adopted a two-stage test when it comes to determining whether it has been infringed. In terms 
of this test, the Court first has to decide whether the complaint falls within the scope of one of 
the rights protected in Article 8(1). In order to answer this question, the Court will have to 
determine the scope and ambit of the right. This will usually involve discussion of what 
constitutes private life, family life, home or correspondence.306 
 
If the ECHR finds that the complaint does fall into the scope of Article 8(1), it will then have 
to go on to the second stage of the test. During this stage, the Court has to determine whether 
there has been an interference with Article 8(1) and, if so, whether the interference can be 
justified in terms of Article 8(2). When it comes to determining whether the interference can 
be justified in terms of Article 8(2), the Court usually accepts that it is lawful and legitimate 
and focuses on whether it is necessary in a democratic society. Most disputes, therefore, turn 
on the question of whether the interference is necessary.307 
 
When it comes to determining whether an interference is necessary, the ECHR applies a 
proportionality test. In Olsson v Sweden, for example, the Court held that “the notion of 
necessity implies that an interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, 
                                                 
306 Ibid at p8.  
307 See (note 304) p 9. 
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that it is proportional to the legitimate aim pursued”. 308 The test of proportionality recognizes 
that human rights are not absolute than that they may be limited by the interests of the general 
public. The goal of this test, therefore, is to strike a fair balance between the interests of the 
general public and the fundamental rights of the individual.309 
 
In order to decide whether an interference is proportional, the ECHR takes into account a 
number of factors. Among these are the nature and importance of the rights that have been 
infringed, the severity of the infringement and the pressing social need which the state is 
aiming to fulfil. The ECHR has also held, however, that states enjoy a margin of appreciation 
when it comes to determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the 
Convention.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that although the essential object of Article 8 is to “protect the 
individual against arbitrary action by the public authorities”, the ECHR has held that there 
may in addition be positive obligations inherent in effective respect for the values it contains. 
This means that apart from the negative obligation not to interfere arbitrarily with a person’s 
private life, family life, home and correspondence, Article 8 also imposes a positive 
obligation on the state to protect a person’s private life, family life, home and correspondence 
from interference by third parties or even to take steps to provide them with these rights.310 
 
 
The positive obligations Article 8 imposes on the state are derived from the fact that it 
expressly provides that everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, home 
and correspondence. In X and Y v Netherlands, for example, the ECHR held that “[Article 8] 
does not merely compel the state to abstain from . . . interference: in addition to this primarily 
negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for 
private and family life . . . These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed 
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309  See (note 305) p31. 
310  Ibid p20. 
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76 
 
4.2.4 Environmental Rights and Article 8 of the Convention 
 
Article 8 of the Convention has been successfully invoked to cover environmental factors on 
a number of occasions by the ECHR. This process may be traced back to the ECHR’s 
judgment in Powell v United Kingdom.312 In this case, the applicants, who lived near to 
Heathrow Airport, applied to the Court for an order declaring that their right to respect for 
their private lives and their homes had been infringed by the excessive noise caused by 
aircraft taking off and landing at the Airport during the day. 
 
The ECHR dismissed the application. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court began by 
accepting that the “quality of [each] applicant’s private life and the scope for enjoying the 
amenities of his home [had] been adversely affected by the noise generated by the aircraft 
using Heathrow Airport. Article 8, therefore, was a material provision in relation to both of 
the applicants.313 
 
After setting out these principles, the ECHR turned to consider whether a fair balance had 
been struck between the conflicting rights of the applicants and the interests of the 
community as a whole. In this respect the Court found that it had. This is because the Airport 
played a central role in the United Kingdom’s economy;314 the United Kingdom had taken a 
number of steps to abate the noise; and the reasonableness of these steps fell within the state’s 
wide margin of appreciation.315 The Court, therefore, could not substitute its views on how 
best to deal with the noise caused by the Airport for those of the United Kingdom. 316 
 
A similar approach was adopted in Lopez Ostra v Spain.317 In this case, the applicants, who 
lived in the town of Lorca, applied to the ECHR for an order declaring that their right to 
respect for their home guaranteed by Article 8 had been infringed by the gas fumes, pestilent 
smells and contaminants released by a waste treatment plant located on municipal land near 
to them and which was operating without a licence. The applicants had been evacuated from 
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their home for a three month period as a result of contaminant being released from the plant 
and their daughter suffered from clinical nausea, vomiting, allergies and other symptoms.  
 
The ECHR upheld the application and granted the order. In arriving at this conclusion, the 
Court began its analysis by confirming that Article 8 could include a right to protection from 
severe environmental pollution. This is because severe environmental pollution “may affect  
individuals’ well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a way as to 
affect their private and family life adversely, without, however, seriously endangering their 
health.318 
 
After setting out these principles, the ECHR once again turned to consider whether a fair 
balance had been struck between the competing rights of the applicants and the interests of 
the community as a whole. In this respect, the Court found that a fair balance had not been 
struck. This is because the Spanish authorities themselves had failed to take action against the 
waste treatment plant despite being aware of the fact that it did not have a licence and that it 
was causing serious environmental problems.319 
 
Following the judgments in Powell and Lopez Ostra, the application of Article 8 to the 
environment was confirmed by the Grand Chamber of the ECHR in Hatton v United 
Kingdom.320 In this case, the applicants, who also lived close to Heathrow Airport, applied for 
an order declaring that their rights to a private life and home had been infringed by the 
excessive noise caused by an increase in the number of aircraft taking off and landing at the 
Airport at night after 1993. The number of aircraft taking off and landing at Heathrow at 
night began to increase in 1993 following the adoption of a new scheme regulating night 
flights. This scheme replaced an earlier system of movement limitation with a system which 
gave airline operators a choice of flying fewer noisy aircraft or more less-noisy aircraft. 
 
The Grand Chamber dismissed the application. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court began 
by stating that while “there is no explicit right in the Convention to a clean and quiet 
environment, . . . where an individual is directly and seriously affected by noise or other 
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pollution, an issue may arise under Article 8”.321 At the same time, however, the Court stated 
further, it was important to reiterate the fundamentally subsidiary nature of the Convention. 
“The national authorities have direct democratic legitimation and are . . . in principle better 
placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions. In matters of 
general policy, on which opinions within a democratic society may reasonably differ widely, 
the role of the domestic policy-maker should be given special weight . . .”.322 
 
After setting out these principles, the Grand Chamber turned to consider whether a fair 
balance had been struck between the competing rights of the applicants and the interests of 
the community as a whole. In this respect, the Grand Chamber found that a fair balance had 
been struck essentially for the same reasons in Powell v United Kingdom, namely that night 
flights made a positive contribution to the United Kingdom’s economy;323 that the United 
Kingdom had taken a number of steps to abate the noise caused by night flights;324 and that 
the reasonableness of these steps fell within the states margin of appreciation.325  
 
In addition, the Grand Chamber also found that house prices in the area had not been 
significantly affected by the increase in noise caused by night flights. This meant that the 








As we have already seen, Article 8 of the Convention was applied to noise pollution in both 
Powell  v United Kingdom and Hatton v United Kingdom. Apart from these two cases, the 
ECHR has also applied Article 8 to noise pollution in a number of other judgments. Amongst 
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the most significant of these are Moreno Gomez v Spain;327 Oluic v Croatia;328 and Dees v 
Hungary.329 Each of these cases will be discussed in turn. 
 
(b) Moreno Gomez v Spain 
 
In this case the applicant lived in a flat in a residential area of Valencia in Spain. She applied 
to the ECHR for an order declaring that her right to a home guaranteed in Article 8 had been 
infringed by the excessive noise generated by bars, discotheques and nightclubs situated close 
to her home. The facts showed in this respect that since 1974 the Valencia City Council had 
allowed bars, discotheques and nightclubs to open in the vicinity of the applicant’s home. 
Unfortunately, these establishments generated an excessive amount of noise and following 
complaints from the applicant and other residents the City Council decided in 1983 that it 
would not allow any more nightclubs to open. This decision, however, was never 
implemented and new licences were granted.  
 
Approximately ten years later, following renewed complaints from the applicant and other 
residents as well as a police investigation, the City Council passed by-laws limiting the 
amount of noise that could be made between 10 pm and 8 am in residential areas.  
In addition, the by-laws also set out conditions that had to be satisfied for an area to be 
declared as an “acoustically saturated area” and the consequences of such a designation, 
which included a ban on any new activities, such as bars, discotheques and nightclubs, that 
lead to acoustic saturation. Like the City Council’s decision in 1983, however, these by-laws 
were never implemented and soon after they were enacted the City Council granted a licence 
for a discotheque to be opened in the applicant’s building even though it was located in an 
acoustically saturated area. 
 
The applicant then applied unsuccessfully to the Spanish courts for relief and thereafter to the 
ECHR.The ECHR upheld the application and granted the order. In arriving at this decision, 
the Court began by stating that Article 8 of the Convention protects the individual's right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. It is important to 
note, however, the Court stated further, that an individual’s right to respect for his or her 
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home does not simply mean “a right to the actual physical area, but also a right to the quiet 
enjoyment of that area”. This means that an infringement of the right is not “confined to 
concrete or physical breaches, such as the unauthorised entry into a person’s home, but could 
also include those that are not concrete or physical, such as noise, emissions, smells and other 
forms of interference”. If a serious breach prevents a person from enjoying the amenities of 
his home, the Court went on it state, it may result in the breach of that person’s right to 
respect for his home.330 
 
After setting out these principles, the ECHR turned to consider whether a fair balance had 
been struck between the competing rights of the applicants and the interests of the community 
as a whole. In this respect, the Court found that a fair balance had not been struck. This was 
because, first, the applicant had suffered a serious infringement of her right to respect for her 
home;331 and, second, even though the City Council had adopted measures, in the form of the 
by-laws, to protect the rights of the applicant and other residents, it had failed to adequately 
enforce its own rules.332  
 
The state, therefore, had failed to discharge its obligation to guarantee the applicant’s right to 




(c) Oluic v Croatia 
 
In this case the applicant owned and lived in part of a house with her family in the town of 
Rijeka in Croatia. She applied to the ECHR for an order declaring that her right to respect for 
her home had been infringed by the excessive noise caused by a bar located in the other part 
of the house. Approximately three years after the bar was opened the applicant wrote to the 
County Sanitary Inspection (a public authority responsible for noise nuisance abatement in 
the area in which she lived) complaining that her home had been constantly exposed to 
excessive noise from the bar which was open from 7am until midnight each day. 
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In 2001 the noise produced by the bar was measured by an independent expert who found 
that exceeded the permitted level, especially at night. Following these findings, the Sanitary 
Inspection ordered the owner of the bar to reduce the level of noise coming from the bar. This 
decision, however, was set aside by the Ministry of Health and the case was remitted to the 
Sanitary Inspection. New measurements were then carried out and these also confirmed that 
the noise produced by the bar exceed the permitted level, especially at night. The Sanitary 
Inspection then ordered the owner to add sound insulation to the walls and floors of the bar. 
 
After several delays, the owners complied with the order and added the sound insulation to 
the walls and floors of the bar. It was subsequently discovered, however, that the sound 
insulation installed by the owner was not sufficient and that the noise produced by the bar 
still exceeded the permitted level. The owner then moved the bar from the first floor of the 
building to the ground floor. Following this move, the Sanitary Inspection terminated all 
proceedings on the grounds that the noise produced by the bar was no longer excessive. 
 
The applicant then applied unsuccessfully to the Croatian Courts for an order reversing the 
Sanitary Inspection’s decision. After this application was dismissed, the applicant turned to 
the ECHR for relief. 
 
The ECHR upheld the application and granted the order. In arriving at this conclusion the 
Court began by reiterating the principles it has set out in Moreno Gomez v Spain, namely that 
the right to respect for the home does not apply only to a physically defined area, but also to 
quiet enjoyment of that area within reasonable limits. Breaches of the right to respect of the 
home, therefore, are not confined to concrete breaches, such as an unauthorised entry into a 
person’s home, but may also include those that are diffuse, such as noise, emissions, smells 
or other similar forms of interference. This means that a serious breach may result in the 
breach of a person right to respect for his home if it prevents that person from enjoying the 
amenities of his or her home.334 
 
In handing down judgment, the Court stated that despite the fact that there was no right to a 
clean and quiet environment under human rights law, an individual who is affected by noise 
and other forms of pollution could rely on Article 8. The Court went on to state that although 
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Article 8 is primarily aimed at protecting the individual against interference by public 
authorities, it may also place a duty on the  authorities to adopt measures aimed at securing 
respect for private life as between private individuals. In order to determine whether Article 8 
has been breached the court must have regard to the competing interests of the individual and 
of the community. 
 
The court then turned to consider whether the noise to which the applicant had been subjected 
breached Article 8. The court noted that the noise levels to which the applicant had been 
exposed had exceeded the permitted levels in terms of the applicable bylaws and had 
exceeded international standards set by the World Health Organisation.335 The volume of the 
noise and the duration of the exposure that the applicant endured, required the authorities to 
put in place measures in order to protect the applicant in terms of Article 8. The Court thus 
concluded that Croatia had failed to discharge its positive obligation, in violation of Article 8. 
 
 
(d) Dees v Hungary 
 
In this case, the applicant lived in a house in the town of Alsonemedi in Hungary. He applied 
to the ECHR for an order declaring that his right to respect for his home had been infringed 
by the noise and vibrations caused by a significant increase in the number of trucks using the 
street on which his house was located. The facts showed in this respect that the number of 
trucks using the applicant’s street began to increase after a toll was introduced on the 
neighbouring, privately owned motorway. In order to avoid paying this (rather expensive) toll 
many truck drivers choose to use alternative routes, including the street on which the 
applicant’s house was located. 
 
In order to deal with this problem, the Hungarian authorities adopted various measures. These 
included building three bypass roads; imposing a 40 km/h speed limit at night; prohibiting 
access for vehicles over six tons; and re-orientating traffic. In addition, monitoring was also 
enhanced by increasing the number of police officers in the neighbourhood and in the 
applicant’s street. The applicant argued, however, that none of these measures was effective 
and he sued the government for compensation. Despite the fact that an expert report indicated 
                                                 




that the noise levels continued to exceed the statutory limit, his claim was dismissed by the 
Hungarian Courts on the grounds that the state had done everything that they could 
reasonably be expected to do. The applicant then applied to the ECHR for relief.  
 
The ECHR upheld the application and granted the order. In arriving at this conclusion the 
Court once again reiterating the principles it has set out in Moreno Gomez v Spain.336After 
reiterating these principles, the Court turned to consider whether a fair balance had been 
struck between the competing rights of the applicants and the interests of the community as a 
whole. In this respect, the Court found that a fair balance had not been struck. This was 
because even though infrastructural issues give rise to very complex problems, none of the 
measures taken by the state in this case were successful and as a result the applicant was 
exposed to excessive noise for a considerable period of time. In addition, the Court held, in 
those cases where the evidence clearly shows that the noise in question significantly exceeds 
statutory levels, the measures adopted by the state must be appropriate.  
 
Unfortunately, the measures adopted by the state in this case were not appropriate.  
This is because they did not succeed in bringing the noise caused by the increase in the 




The ECHR appears to follow a two-stage approach when it applies Article 8. This is similar 
to the approach followed by the Constitutional Court. In terms of this two-stage approach, the 
ECHR first has to determine whether the right infringed falls into the scope of Article 8 and, 
if so, whether the infringement of Article 8 is justifiable. Most cases seem to turn on the 
question of justifiability. In order to determine whether an infringement is justifiable, the 
ECHR has to balance the rights of the applicant against the interests of the community as a 
whole.  
 
When it comes to determining whether the steps taken by the state to address noise pollution 
are reasonable, the ECHR applies a wide margin of appreciation. Fourth, when it comes to 
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determining whether a noise infringement is justifiable the ECHR appears to apply the 
following rules: 
 
(a) If the state has not taken any steps to deal with the noise pollution, the Court will 
inevitably find that the infringement is unjustifiable. 
(b) If the state has adopted laws to deal with noise pollution, but has failed to implement 
those laws, the Court will inevitably find that the infringement is unjustifiable (Moreno 
Gomez v Spain). 
(c) If the state has adopted laws and taken steps to implement those laws, but the noise    
      pollution continues to significantly exceed statutory limits (in other words, if the steps  
      fail), the Court will find that the infringement is unjustifiable (Dees v Hungary). 
(d) If the state has adopted laws and taken steps to implement those laws and those laws and  
     steps fall into the state’s margin of appreciation (in other words they are laws and steps  
      over which reasonable people can disagree), the Court will find that the infringement is  






















4.3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 
 
Having examined the scope and ambit of Article 8 of the Convention, we will now turn to 
consider the scope and ambit of the right to a healthy environment guaranteed in section 24 of 
the Constitution. Section 24 provides in this respect that: 
 
“Everyone has the right: 
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and 
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, 
through reasonable legislative and other measures that: 
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii)  promote conservation; and 
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while 
promoting justifiable economic and social development”. 
 
Subsection (a) is a fundamental right, while subsection (b) places a positive duty on the state 
to protect the environment for the benefit of future generations.338 In terms of subsection (a), 
all citizens have a right to an environment that is not harmful to their health and an 
environment that is not harmful to their well-being.339 The concept of health concerns human 
health and encompasses mental and physical health.340 The World Health Organisation 
(hereafter, the WHO), has defined health as a “state of complete physical, mental and social 
well-being”.341 The conservation of biodiversity, flora and fauna are included under the 
concept of well- being.342 
 
The environmental clause has been engaged in the case of Minister of Health and Welfare v 
Woodcarb (Pty) Ltd and other.343 to promote environmental concerns and protect people in 
communities exposed to pollution. This case involved an interpretation of the environmental 
right in terms of the interim Constitution.344 
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The applicant approached the Court for an interdict to stop the respondent from operating an 
incinerating process without the necessary registration certificate which was required in terms 
of the Atmospheric Pollution Act.345 In addition to the fact that the respondent had breached 
the provisions of the Act, the applicant had also received complaints from the occupiers of  
neighbouring properties about smoke emissions from the plant operated by the respondent. 
 
The Court held that the respondent had been operating the incineration process without the 
necessary certificate and held further that the generation of  the smoke by the respondent was 
an infringement of the right of the respondent’s neighbours to “an environment which is not 
detrimental to their health or well-being” enshrined in section 29 of the interim 
Constitution.346 It is suggested by Glazewski that as a result of this decision, the  principle of 
reasonable use in the law of neighbours that is based on the common law  maxim sic utere 
tuo ut alienum non laedes ( use your property in a way which does not harm another) has 
been brought into the realm of public law.347 
 
In terms of subsection (b) of the environmental clause, the state has a positive duty to protect 
the environment for future and present generations through reasonable legislative and 
administrative measures. Through these means the state is required to prevent pollution and 
ecological degradation; promote conservation; and secure ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources whilst also promoting justifiable economic and 
social development. As we have seen, the word pollution as defined in the NEMA and  
includes  noise pollution.348 In addition, and in terms of subsection (b), the State must not 
cause pollution or ecological degradation. A failure by the state to take steps to ensure these 
goals, will result in the violation of the right to have the environment protected.349  
 
If a citizen suffers the effects of uncontrolled noise he or she can allege that his or her right to 
an environment that is not harmful to health and well –being, enshrined in section 24(a) has 
been violated. Excessive and uncontrolled noise can have severe consequences for both 
mental and physical well-being of human beings. As we have seen, the State is responsible 
for putting in place measures and legislation to prevent pollution, therefore the State will be 
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in violation of this right if it has failed to put in place the required legislation to control noise 
pollution. 
 
The interpretation of Article 8 of the Convention by the ECHR may assist a South African 
Court in circumstances where there is an alleged breach of the environmental right due to 
noise. As stated previously in this chapter, the ECHR follows a two-stage approach when it 
applies Article 8 which is similar the South African Constitutional Court. The first step is to 
determine whether there is an infringement of the right and if this is the case, to then 
determine whether the infringement is justifiable.  
 
In determining whether the infringement is just, the court is required to balance the interests 
of the affected individual against the interests of the community. This process requires an 
examination of the steps taken by the State to address noise pollution and whether these steps 
were reasonable. Insofar as this is concerned, a South African court will have to consider 
whether the state has taken any steps to deal with the noise pollution ( for example enacting 
legislation to prevent such pollution) and if it has not, the Court will  find that the 
infringement is unjustifiable. If the State succeeded in putting in place legislation to curb the 
noise complained of, and the State has put in place the necessary legislation to deal with the 
noise pollution but has failed to enforce these laws, the infringement of the right will be 
regarded as unjustifiable (Moreno Gomez v Spain). The jurisprudence of the ECHR is also 
helpful in that it may be argued that even if the state has enacted laws and taken steps to 
implement those laws but the noise pollution continues, the Court will find that the 





Section 24 of the Bill of Rights protects the right of person to an environment that is not 
detrimental to   health and well-being. A person who is suffering the effects of uncontrolled 
noise pollution may bring a claim against the authority responsible for ensuring that this right 
is not breached. A constitutional challenge may also be based on the right to property as well 




The ECHR has consistently held, that if the State fails protect an individual from noise 
pollution, because of its failure to put  in place measures to stop the noise, the State will be in 
breach of the right to respect for private; family life and home. The decision in Oluic v 
Croatia is significant as the court took into account the World Health Organisation 
environmental noise standards to hold that the State was in breach of the duty to protect the 
applicant from excessive noise. These decisions, although not binding on courts in South 






























CHAPTER FIVE:  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Noise is a recognised pollutant in South African environmental law. The adverse effects of 
uncontrolled noise on the physical and psychological health of human beings is well 
documented.350 As a result, The WHO has stated that it is the responsibility of governments 
in countries around the world to implement and enforce policies and legislation for 
controlling noise in order to prevent the potentially harmful impact that uncontrolled noise 
can have on people.351 Although noise is viewed largely as a ‘luxury’ problem of the first 
world, it would appear that noise exposure in developing countries is often higher because of 
bad planning and poor building construction.352  As a result the effects of noise are the same, 
and the need for intervention to control noise exposure is imperative.353 Research has shown 
that there is a direct relationship between development and the amount of noise pollution 
impacting on the population of a country, based on the fact that as society develops and 
grows, urbanisation; industrialisation and traffic will also increase.354 
 
The WHO has highlighted the fact that unlike other pollutants, the control of noise has to a 
large extent been hampered by the lack of knowledge on the effects of noise on people.355If 
governments do not intervene, the level of noise will increase and the adverse health effects 
as a result of the uncontrolled noise will escalate.356 It is necessary for governments to 
implement strong and regulations, which must also be effectively enforced.357 
 
In South Africa, noise pollution has traditionally been addressed by means of the common 
law rules of the law of nuisance. Whilst  the common law has been relatively successful in 
controlling noise, it must be appreciated that using the common law as a means of controlling 
noise pollution can be relatively unwieldy and costly as the litigants must themselves, out of 
necessity, approach a court for relief. A court will use the standard of the reasonable person 
to determine whether the noise in question amounts to a nuisance.  
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It has been suggested that the common law standard of the reasonable person, may perhaps be 
inadequate in the highly industrialised modern world that we live in and that there is a need 
for a more objective standard to deal with noise control.358 Whilst this may indeed be so, the 
standard of the reasonable man is also advantageous in that it is flexible and can therefore be 
adapted to any given set of facts.359  
 
In addition to the common law, there is a fairly sophisticated and comprehensive framework 
of statutory provisions in South Africa to address the problem of noise pollution. The most 
important and comprehensive statutory provisions relating to the control of noise pollution 
are contained in section 25 of Environment Conservation Act.360  In terms of section 25, the 
Minister of Environmental Affairs has the power to make regulations aimed at controlling 
noise; vibration and shock. Noise Control Regulations have been enacted by three provinces, 
namely: the Free State;361 Gauteng;362 and Western Cape.363 These Provincial Noise Control 
Regulations have been modelled on the draft National Noise Control Regulations364 and thus 
bear a close resemblance to each other.  
 
In the rest of the country regulations published under the new political system as well as local 
authority by-laws from the old political dispensation are applicable. In addition, by-laws to 
deal with noise have been enacted by several local authorities. A person who is the victim of 
noise will report the noise to the authorities who must then enforce the relevant regulations or 
by-laws on his or her behalf.  In municipalities that do not have noise control regulations or 
equivalent by-laws in place to control noise, the victim of noise will have to rely on the 
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Whilst it is acknowledged that comprehensive and sophisticated legislation does indeed exist 
to deal with noise, the criticism that may be raised, is that noise control legislation is 
selectively applicable and fragmented. It would be far more advantageous to have a national 
legislative framework for noise control legislation which will allow for the incorporation of 
noise standards into development planning.365 If noise standards are incorporated into 
planning and development, any potential problem of excessive noise can be dealt with in the 
initial stages of a project. Solutions to problems are far more expensive and difficult to 
enforce once a building project is completed. 
 
The efficacy of noise control legislation will depend largely on its effective implementation. 
The administration of noise control legislation, in terms of Schedule 5 of the constitution, is a 
function of local government. It would therefore be necessary for local government to have 
the necessary capacity and resources to adequately carry out the function of enforcement. 
Government must take steps to ensure that the capacity of local government to do so is 
bolstered. 
 
Although noise is a recognised pollutant in South Africa, there has been no constitutional 
challenge based on noise. The Bill of Rights protects the right of person to an environment 
that is not detrimental to health and well-being. It is submitted that person who is suffering 
the effects of uncontrolled noise pollution may bring a claim against the authority responsible 
for ensuring that this right is not breached.  Ensuring that a person is not exposed to pollution 
is the responsibility of government, and consequently this right will be breached by 
government if it fails to put a stop to polluting activities. A constitutional challenge may also 
be based on the right to property as well and the right to freedom of security of person. 
 
Noise will continue to be a problem plaguing the modern world as technology; 
industrialisation; and urbanisation increase. Legislation will not be effective unless it is 
effectively enforced and more importantly, people must be educated about the negative 
impacts of uncontrolled noise. 
                                                 




In the Guidelines on Community Noise366, the WHO proposes that successful management of 
noise should be based on the fundamental  principles of precaution, the polluter pays and 
prevention. 
 
1. ‘The precautionary principle. In all cases, noise should be reduced to the lowest level 
achievable in a particular situation. Where there is a reasonable possibility that public health 
will be damaged, action should be taken to protect public health without awaiting full scientific 
proof. 
 
2. The polluter pays principle. The full costs associated with noise pollution (including 
monitoring, management, lowering levels and supervision) should be met by those responsible 
for the source of noise. 
 
3. The prevention principle. Action should be taken where possible to reduce noise at the 
source. Land-use planning should be guided by an environmental health impact assessment that 
considers noise as well as other pollutants.’ 367  
 
It is submitted that this approach to noise management should inform any future                       
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